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PROOF AND CONSEQUENCES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
TADIC & AKAYESU TRIALS
INTRODUCTION
"The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so
calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot
tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being re-
peated."1 In 1945, Justice Robert Jackson used this poetic phrase in
his opening statement at the Nuremberg Trials.2 Unfortunately, it ap-
pears that the wrongs he spoke of have been repeated in the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and many other regions all over the
world. Through the formation of ad hoc International Criminal Tribu-
nals, the world has acted to condemn and punish those who have com-
mitted wrongs in the renewed hope that such wrongs will not continue
to occur.
The International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution and Punish-
ment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis ("IMT") cre-
ated by the Allies of World War II in Nuremberg, Germany3 stands as
the only precedent involving the trial of international criminals by an
internationally-created adjudicating body. 4 The work of the Tribunal
at Nuremberg contributed greatly to the development of international
law. It promulgated the idea that "no one should be left totally aban-
doned to the vagaries of his or her government and that.., the inter-
1. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 167 (1992) (quoting open-
ing statement of Justice Jackson at the Nuremberg Trials).
2. See id.
3. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. The IMT Charter was annexed to this
document.
4. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East ("IMTFE") was created a year after
the one in Nuremberg, on January 19, 1946. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sources and Content
of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Framework, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3,
6 n.12 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Sources and Content]. It
was modeled exclusively after the IMT at Nuremberg and the trials that took place under the
IMTFE, known as the Tokyo trials. See id. The IMT and IMTFE are the only adjudicating
bodies in history to have the ability to directly enforce their decisions. See id. at 14. In other
words, because the Allies controlled both Germany and Japan entirely, the IMT did not need to
rely on the cooperation of the offending countries' domestic laws to enforce its judgments. See
id. at 6-7. This is much different from the to-be-discussed current international tribunals, that
rely heavily on the cooperation of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda at every step of adjudica-
tion-from the indictment stage to the sentencing stage. See id. at 14.
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national community will not stand idly by .... ,,5 Nuremberg also
suggested that international criminal law and its norms will be en-
forced.6 For the first time, individual culpability for crimes against
humanity became enforceable under international law.7 The tribunals
developed recently have been shaped, to a large extent, after the Nu-
remberg model.8
The present international criminal tribunals, while attempting to ac-
complish the valuable objectives set forth at Nuremberg, must steer
clear of the shortcomings that plagued its operation.9 The trials con-
ducted at Nuremberg have been criticized for a lack of "judicial im-
partiality," ex post facto application of "Allied-formulated laws," and
adjudication by judges from only the victorious nations of World War
I.10
The currently functioning internationally-created tribunals have
been established to prosecute war criminals.1 Though these tribunals
were created to provide a forum for the prosecution of international
criminals, they are, in many ways, similar to domestic courts.12 Inter-
national trials, however, present unique evidentiary problems that, for
the most part, do not arise in domestic prosecutions. 13 The Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") were both
modeled after Nuremberg and established for the prosecution of in-
ternational criminals. The international criminal cases tried at each of
these tribunals so far have presented unique evidentiary problems be-
cause of the massive character of the crimes committed and the
unique history of each country. 14 The admittance of anonymous testi-
mony and hearsay evidence has also raised serious questions about
whether a balance can be struck to simultaneously ensure that defend-
5. Christian Tomuschat, International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of Nuremberg
Confirmed, 5 CRIM. L.F. 237, 238 (1994).
6. See Matthew I. Kupferberg, Note, Balkan War Crimes Trials: Forum Selection, 17 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 375, 384-85 (1994).
7. See id. at 384.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See Melissa Gordon, Note and Comment, Justice on Trial: The Efficacy of the International
Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda, 1 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp. L. 217, 225-27 (1995).
10. See Mark A. Bland, Note, An Analysis of the United Nations International Tribunal to
Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia: Parallels, Problems, Prospects, 2
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 233, 246 (1994).
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. The current Tribunals' statutes and rules of evidence and procedure were developed based
on the rules that govern domestic courts throughout the world. See infra Part I.B.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part I.A.
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ants are receiving fair trials in such politically-charged prosecutions
and that victims and witnesses are being adequately protected. 15
Part I first explains the historical background of the conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda that led to the establishment of the
respective Tribunals. 16 Next, the historical underpinnings of the
Tribunals themselves, including their establishment, jurisdictional au-
thority, statutes, and rules of evidence and procedure, are discussed. 17
Part II briefly discusses the roles Dusko Tadic, one defendant in the
ICTY, and Jean-Paul Akayesu, a defendant in the ICTR, played in the
respective conflicts. 18 Several evidentiary rulings made in each trial,
including the use of anonymous witnesses and the admission of hear-
say evidence, are then closely examined. 19 These evidentiary rulings
are analyzed to determine whether they comport with international
norms and more general concepts of justice. Where the rulings do not
seem to comply with these norms, a preferable solution is presented.
Finally, in Part III, consideration is given to the steps which ought to
be taken in drafting the yet-to-be-fixed International Criminal Court
("ICC") rules of evidence.20 A determination is made as to how the
rules and rulings of the ICTY and ICTR might affect future criminal
cases brought before the ICC. Part IV concludes that the evidentiary
problems previously encountered should be recognized and
remedied. 21
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A brief examination of the histories of the sordid conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda will help explain both the role of the
individual defendants in the respective conflicts and the necessity for
the Tribunals. Once that is concluded, an analysis of the creation and
composition of the Tribunals will follow to illustrate how problems not
often encountered in domestic trials are likely to arise in these forums.
A. Conflicts
The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are similar in
many ways. Both are based on political, cultural, and religious strug-
15. See infra Part II.C-D.
16. See infra Part I.A.
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. See infra Part II.A-B.
19. See infra Part II.C-D.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
2000]
984 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:981
gles between groups of people with historically defined differences. 22
While the conflict in the Balkans is primarily driven by ethnic and
religious differences, the one in Rwanda is based on a type of racial
differentiation. 23 The crimes that occurred in both regions are similar
in the way they were fostered by the use of massive propaganda. 24
1. The Balkan Conflict
"[A] war of intimate betrayals. ",25
The 600-year conflict in the former Yugoslavia has led to its charac-
terization as a "boiling cauldron of ethnic tension. '26 The ingredients
in this "cauldron" are the four major ethnic groups in the region-
Serbs, Muslims, Croats, and Slovenes. 27 The genesis of the conflict
between the present-day Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims is said
to lie in the Ottoman Turk defeat of Serbian forces in the Battle of
Kosovo on June 28, 1389.28 After this defeat, Bosnia and Serbia were
absorbed into the Ottoman Empire, which thereafter conducted a
process of "Islamization" of the local populations.29 Christians in the
conquered territory became the target of religious oppression and
subjugation. 30 The Turks, who were Muslim, granted only second-
class citizenship to the Christians, reducing them to "a society of peas-
ants and small merchants."'3' All non-Muslims were made to pay a
poll tax and forced to perform free labor.32 While many Christians
22. See infra Part I.A.l-I.A.2.
23. See infra Part I.A.l-I.A.2.
24. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JusTICE 25, 27-28 (1997) (discussing the use of
propaganda by Slobodan Milosevic to instigate Serbian nationalism and ethnic hatred); GERARD
PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 48-49, 137, 200 (1995) (describing the
initiation of riots and uprisings based on false news and political leaflets).
25. ROGER COHEN, HEARTS GROWN BRUTAL: SAGAS OF SARAJEVO xvi (1998).
26. SCHARF, supra note 24, at 21.
27. Though much of the Balkan conflict involves all of these ethnic groups, the main focus of
this Comment is that between the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. It is also important to
remember that a mix of these groups is found throughout the entire region.
28. See BRANIMIR ANZULOVIC, HEAVENLY SERBIA: FROM MYTH TO GENOCIDE 1-2 (1999)
(explaining the 1389 Battle of Kosovo as a forceful influence in the historical struggle in the
former Yugoslavia); VLADIMIR DEDIJER & IVAN BOZIC ET AL., HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA 115-
16 (1974) (describing the Battle of Kosovo).
29. See DEDIJER & Bozic, supra note 28, at 141. Before the Turks' victory, most inhabitants
were Christian-either Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox. See ANZULOViC, supra note 28,
at 17-31. While Bosnia and Herzegovina were controlled by the Ottoman Empire, Croatia and
Slovenia were absorbed into the Hapsburg Empire, though in reality, they maintained their inde-
pendence. See DEDIJER & BOZIC, supra at 147.
30. Though non-Muslims faced much discrimination from their Turkish rulers, the Serbian
Orthodox Church maintained a privileged status among all other Christian denominations. See
ANZULOVIC, supra note 28, at 42.
31. Id. at 33.
32. See id. at 34.
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acquiesced to this status, others became Muslims to prevent their own
oppression. 33 The hatred many Bosnian Serbs currently hold toward
Bosnian Muslims derives, at least partially, from what the Serbs (who
remained Christian) felt to be a "betrayal of the true faith by their
ancestors" who converted to Islam.34
Centuries later, in 1908, the Hapsburg Empire annexed Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 35 which sparked Serb nationalism because the newly-im-
plemented government was primarily occupied by Catholics.36 The
surge in Serb nationalism led to Balkan wars in 1912 and 191337 and
the eventual "liberation of the Balkan peninsula from Ottoman con-
trol."'38 Seeking to free the region from foreign domination alto-
gether, Gavrilo Princip, a Serb nationalist, assassinated the heir to the
Hapsburg Empire, Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, in Sarajevo on
June 28, 1914,39 not coincidentally, the anniversary of the Battle of
Kosovo. 40 At the end of World War I, in 1918, the Serbian king41
announced the liberation of the peninsula pronouncing it the "Land of
the South Slavs," or Yugoslavia. 42 The king was assassinated, though,
in 1934 by Velicko Georgijev-Kerin. 43 This murder led to the region's
33. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 22.
34. Id.
35. See DEDUER & Bozic, supra note 28, at 449.
36. See id. Even though there were twice as many Serbian Orthodox Christians in the terri-
tory, Catholics were given the majority position in the government assembly and a Muslim was
appointed as its president. See id.
37. During the Balkan wars, "Serbian nationalists resorted to ethnic violence on a massive
scale" in their attempt to expel the Turks. SCHARF, supra note 24, at 22. "Terror was the method
[the Serbs] employed to rule over [their] subjects" after they liberated themselves from foreign
control. ANZULOVIC, supra note 28, at 88.
38. SCHARF, supra note 24, at 22.
39. See DEDIJER & Bozic, supra note 28, at 469. This assassination is said to have started
World War 1, though as Dedijer and Bozic suggest, it is unlikely that under "normal" circum-
stances such an event would have caused such "significant consequences." Id.
40. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 22.
41. See Elizabeth L. Pearl, Note, Punishing Balkan War Criminals: Could the End of Yugosla-
via Provide an End to Victor's Justice?, 30 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1373, 1380 (1993). On January 6,
1929, King Alexander arranged a coup d'etat with the intent and effect of instituting a totalitar-
ian dictatorship to resolve the rampant ethnic tensions throughout Yugoslavia. See DEDIJER &
Bozic, supra note 28, at 540. He eventually reinstated democracy by way of a September 3, 1931
constitution because his regime "was in a crisis." Id. at 542. However, he forced all potential
candidates for government positions to take an oath that they would not be part of any "reli-
gious, ethnic, or regional political [parties]." Pearl, supra at 1380.
42. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 22.
43. See DEDIJER & Bozic, supra note 28, at 545. There are differing histories as to whom this
assassin held his loyalty. One source seems to suggest that he was part of a Croatian uprising.
See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 23. This uprising was called the Ustasha, meaning uprising, and
was formed "to implement a ... brutal exclusivist ethnic program against the Serbs" with the
intention of Croatian independence. NORMAN CIGAR, GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA: THE POLICY OF
"ETHNIC CLEANSING" 19 (1995). Another source, however, indicates that there may have been
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vulnerability to the Axis Powers' invasion on April 6, 1941. 44 After
invading Yugoslavia, the Axis Powers divided the region into many
spheres of control-one German, one Italian, one Hungarian, and one
Bulgarian. 45
It was not until after World War II that Yugoslavia again became,
however nominally, a united nation.46 With the help of the Allied
Powers, Josip Broz Tito, 47 a Croat and partisan Communist leader
with Serbian supporters, took control of Yugoslavia in 1946.48 Tito
established a federal system comprising the republics of Serbia, Croa-
tia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. 49 As
retribution against those Serbs who refused to support him in his take-
over of the region, Tito ordered the "mass execution" of civilian refu-
gees, Chetnik leaders °5 0 and Nazis.5 1 The remaining reticent Serbs
were divided among the republics, with most being sent to Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 52 When Tito died in 1980, the "disintegration" of the
region began.5 3 The impetus of this disintegration was the dissolution
of the collective leadership system 54 implemented after Tito's death. 55
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina wanted to eject the Com-
a connection between the assassin and the Italian or Hungarian governments. See DEDIJER &
Bozic, supra at 545-46.
44. See DEDIJER & Bozic, supra note 28, at 566; SCHARF, supra note 24, at 23.
45. See DEDIJER & Bozic, supra note 28, at 571. Croatia was run as a puppet state, with the
permission of Nazi Germany, by Ustasha leader, Ante Pavelic, who had been convicted and
sentenced to death in abstentia for the assassination of King Alexander just seven years before.
See id. at 572-74. Pavelic helped the Nazis in their racist policy to eliminate the Serbs, killing
between 200,000 and 500,000 of them during this period. See id. at 577-82. This puppet state
included Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, Srem, and part of Dalmatia. See id. at 572.
46. See id. at 698. On November 29, 1945, Yugoslavia was declared the Federal People's Re-
public of Yugoslavia. See id.
47. Tito's plan as leader was to unite Yugoslavia as a socialist country. See Pearl, supra note
41, at 1380.
48. When Tito's partisan group took power, it killed over 100,000 Croatians as revenge for
those Serbs killed during World War II. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 24.
49. See id. Within the Serbian republic, Kosovo and Vojvodina existed as "autonomous prov-
inces." Id. The system included a rotating presidency so that a leader from each republic would
hold the presidency of Yugoslavia for a certain period of time until it was another republic's
turn. See id. at 26.
50. The Serbs, after World War i, separated into two opposing groups, the Chetniks, who
favored a monarchy and a "Greater Serbia," and the Communists, guided by Tito, who envi-
sioned a "Socialist Yugoslavia." Pearl, supra note 41, at 1380.
51. See id. at 1381.
52. See id.
53. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 24.
54. Under this system, the presidency of Yugoslavia was to be comprised of representatives
from each republic working cooperatively. See Pearl, supra note 41, at 1381.
55. See id.
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munist regime, but Serbia wanted to preserve that government. 56 This
conflict gave rise to unrest and an almost immediate declaration of
independence by Slovenia. 57 Serbian nationalism was rekindled as the
Serbs feared the total disintegration of Yugoslavia. 58 Serb nationalism
was sustained through the spreading of ethnic-based, government-
sponsored propaganda against Muslims and Croats.
59
The balkanization of Yugoslavia came to a head in 1991 when the
leader of the Serbian Communist Party, Slobodan Milosevic, effec-
tively inhibited the Croatian leader, Stipe Mesic, from taking his turn
as president of the rotating leadership in violation of the Yugoslav
Constitution. 60 This caused Croatia to declare its independence.
6t
Because of his supposed concern for the 500,000 Serbs living in the
now-independent republics outside Serbia, Milosevic sent the "Serb-
dominated Yugoslav National Army" ("JNA") to invade both Slove-
nia and Croatia. 62 During these invasions, the JNA began the "ethnic
cleansing" 63 of Croats, which spilled over to Muslims in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 64
In early 1992, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats declared the inde-
pendence of Bosnia-Herzegovina causing the Serbs to attack both
populations within Bosnia, based on an asserted need to protect the
ethnic Serbs within the province. 65 Information collected by the
United Nations and human rights organizations suggested that Serbs,
including Bosnian Serbs, were attempting to cleanse the region of
Muslims and Croats. 66 This ethnic cleansing was accomplished by
"mass forced-population transfers of Muslims, organized massacres,
the physical destruction of whole towns, the systematic and repeated
rape of thousands of Muslim women and young girls, and the exist-
56. See id. Serbian morale to preserve the Communist government was boosted by Slobodan
Milosevic, an important and menancing figure in later Serbian history. See id. at 1382.
57. See id.
58. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 25.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 26.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Ethnic cleansing is defined as "the forcible expulsion of nondominant ethnic groups in a
given canton." BOGDAN DENITCH, ETHNIC NATIONALISM: THE TRAGIC DEATH OF YUGOSLA-
VIA 7 (rev. ed. 1994).
64. See Pearl, supra note 41, at 1382. For example, during its invasion of Croatia, the JNA
massacred over 200 Croatian hospital patients and then discarded their bodies in a mass grave.
See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 26.
65. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 27-28. Bosnia-Herzegovina is made up of Slavic Muslims,
Croats, and ethnic Serbs. See Pearl, supra note 41, at 1382.
66. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 28-29.
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ence of over four hundred Serb-run detention centers. '67 At the end
of 1994, "the Serbs had expelled, killed or imprisoned 90 percent of
the 1.7 million non-Serbs who once lived in Serbian-held areas of Bos-
nia."'68 It is this Serbian attack on Bosnian Muslims that is the subject
of most of the cases being tried at the ICTY.69
2. The Rwandan Conflict
"The last battle of the colonised against the coloniser will often be the
fight of the colonised against each other."'70
Unlike that in the former Yugoslavia, the conflict in Rwanda is not
the "result of a deep-rooted and ancient hatred between two ethnic
groups. ' 71 Rather, it stems from the colonization of Rwanda by "ra-
cially-obsessed nineteenth-century Europeans. '7 2 At the 1885 Berlin
Conference, it was decided that Rwanda would be the responsibility
of Germany, which maintained control until after World War 1. 73 In
1924, the League of Nations mandated that Belgium take over the
rule of Rwanda and Burundi, which it did until 1962.74 When Belgium
began its administration, Rwanda was run by Mwami (or King) Yuhi
V Musinga, the head of the Tutsi dynasty; however, in 1931, Musinga
was deposed and exiled. 75 Belgium then appointed a king who would
67. Id. at 29. The detention camps include Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje, which are the
camps at which Dusko Tadic was alleged to have committed the atrocities of which he was con-
victed. Indictment, Prosecutor v. Tadic a/k/a "Dule" and Goran Borovnica, Feb. 13, 1995, at 12
<http://www.courttv.com/casefiles/warcrimes/documents/borov.html> [hereinafter Tadic Indict-
ment].
68. SCHARF, supra note 24, at 29.
69. There are also Croats and Muslims who have been indicted for war crimes. See
<http://www.un.org/icty/cases-te.htm>. Likewise, Slobodan Milosevic and others have been in-
dicted for more recent crimes against the Kosovars. See <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/inde.htm>.
70. PRUNIER, supra note 24, at xi (quoting FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH
(1986)).
71. ALAIN DESTEXHE, RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 36 (1995).
72. PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 6. The Europeans who explored Rwanda and many unin-
formed people today have often referred to the different groups (Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa) as tribes.
See id. at 5. This is a misnomer because the groups had none of the attributes of tribes; rather,
all shared the same language (Bantu), lived side-by-side, and intermarried. See id.
73. See DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 78. While the Germans occupied Rwanda until the end
of World War 1, their presence was insignificant. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 24-25. Their
ignorance of the complex local politics in Rwanda led them unknowingly to bolster the hierar-
chical elite Tutsi. See id. at 25.
74. See DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 78.
75. See id. The Belgians disliked Musinga because he supported the Germans in their fight
against Belgian appropriation of the region. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 30. Likewise, "he
was haughty and unruly, his mother was a pest, he was openly adulterous, bisexual and incestu-
ous, he never converted to Christianity and he deviously tried to hijack the white man's civilising
mission for his political benefit." Id.
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be more favorable to the Belgium colonization of Rwanda.76 The Bel-
gian colonizers stratified the three groups of Rwandans-Hutu, Tutsi,
and Twa-based on perceived racial characteristics. Distinctions be-
tween groups were premised on who looked more "white"; therefore,
the Tutsi, who made up about 15% of the population 77 and have a
lighter skin color, were considered to be the more intelligent and no-
ble of the peoples.7 8 Similarly, the Hutu, who made up about 84% of
the population and have darker skin, were considered less intelligent
and noble because they were less white.79 The final group, the Twa, or
pygmies, made up only 1% of the population 80 and were considered to
be "'a caste of dwarfs"' by the colonizers.81 This characterization of
the different groups led to the indoctrination of the natives them-
selves. In other words, the natives were so completely submerged in
"highly value-laden stereotypes" that the Tutsi developed a dropsical
self-importance and the Hutu acquired an "inferiority complex"
sparking racial enmity toward the Tutsi.82 To reinforce stratification,
the colonizers made it mandatory that all persons carry an identity
card stating their ethnicity. 83
Between the 1920s and 1940s, the Belgians supported the Tutsi mo-
nopoly of power. 84 Eventually, however, the Tutsi began to recognize
the benefits of racial equality with white colonizers and the possibility
of self-government. 85 These fueled a desire for independence. 86 The
76. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 30-31. The next king, Musinga's son, Mutara, was called
"'King of the Whites,"' as he "dressed well in Western clothes .... drove his own car, was
monogamous and ... converted to Christianity." Id. at 31.
77. See Judgement, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T. Sept. 2,1998, at 21 (Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) <http://www.un.org/ictr/english/judgements/akayesu.html>
[hereinafter Akayesu Judgement].
78. See DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 38.
79. See id. at 37-39.
80. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 5.
81. See DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 39.
82. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 9. Prunier's argument is that through this indoctrination to
racial stratification, both the Tutsi and Hutu began to believe the myth developed by their colo-
nizers. See id. at 39. The colonizer's myth had been "synthesized into a new reality." Id.
83. See DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 40. This card-carrying requirement was not abolished
until after the atrocities in 1994. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 21.
84. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 28. Belgian legislators, for example, helped the Tutsi mod-
ify land and contractual rights to favor them over the Hutu. See id. This often allowed Tutsi to
gain control over Hutu landholdings. See id.
85. See id. at 43.
86. See id. In 1951, a noticeable shift emerged in Rwandan clergy because "control of the
Rwandese church was slowly slipping from the hands of the whites." Id. This shift was indica-
tive, the Tutsi began to realize, of the possible power they could obtain at the conclusion of
colonial rule. See id.
2000]
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Belgians, afraid of a Tutsi-independence movement,8 7 began to shift
their support to the Hutu by offering them more political and educa-
tional opportunities, which, in turn, angered the Tutsi.88 With
Belgium's fear-induced installation of universal voting rights, the
Hutu began to realize their political strength. The Tutsi saw the grant-
ing of universal suffrage as a slight to their supremacy, making "con-
frontation with the Hutu ... inevitable. ' 89 Concurrent with Belgium's
grant of political power to the Hutu, Hutu intellectuals began to con-
front Tutsi domination in documents like the Bahutu Manifesto ("the
Manifesto").90 These intellectuals along with a number of revolution-
aries believed the Hutu to be the natives of Rwanda and the Tutsi to
be immigrants from Ethiopia 9 who needed to be expelled to their
own native land. 92 With the publication of the Manifesto, Rwanda be-
came a hotbed of "political rivalry" and unrest.93
In 1959, a series of Hutu riots, triggered by propaganda that a Hutu
activist had been killed, 94 escalated into a revolution by the masses
against the dominant Tutsi, resulting in the death of many Tutsi and
the exile of many more.95 This revolution "represented a turning
87. See id. at 44. The Belgians realized that European control over the church was being
challenged and that white power was likely to be challenged on other fronts as well. See id.
88. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 21. Throughout this Comment, in referring to
this judgment, the spelling of "Judgement" that was used at the ICTR will be employed. White
church leaders also began to shift their support to the Hutu upon realizing the challenge of the
Tutsi elite to their power. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 44.
89. Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 22.
90. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 45. The Manifesto was published as Notes on the Social
Aspect of the Racial Native Problem in Rwanda. See id. It pointed to the "humiliation and socio-
economic inferiority of the Hutu community." Id.
91. The idea that the Tutsi were from Ethiopia came from the writings of Nile explorer, John
Harming Speke, who "decided without a shred of evidence" that the Tutsi were descendants of
the Galla of southern Ethiopia. See id. at 7.
92. See DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 43-44. During the conflict which is the subject of the
ICTR, the Hutu sent bodies of the Tutsi down River Nyaborongo towards Lake Victoria claim-
ing this to be "the shortest way back to Ethiopia." Id. at 49. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note
77, at 26 (explaining the testimony of Dr. Alison Desforges in which she stated that the underly-
ing motivation for putting bodies in the river was to "send the Tutsi back to their place of ori-
gin"). Forty-thousand bodies were found in Lake Victoria after the war ended. See PRUNIER,
supra note 24, at 255.
93. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 47. Political parties were formed immediately. See id. The
Hutu formed the Hutu Social Movement, created by Gr6goire Kayibanda, and the Association
for the Social Promotion of the Masses, created by Joseph Gitera. See id. The Tutsi created the
Rwandese Nation Union, which favored a monarchy and independence from Belgium. See id.
94. See id. at 48. Dominique Mbonyumutwa was severely beaten by members of a Tutsi polit-
ical party. See id. Though Mbonyumutwa did not die, false news of his death sparked Hutu
action. See id.
95. See DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 43-44. Destexhe claims that there were 20,000 Tutsi
killed in the revolution of 1959. See id. at 44. However, Prunier argues that this is a mathemati-
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point in the political history of Rwanda. '96 Just three years later, on
July 1, 1962, Rwanda declared its independence from Belgium, nam-
ing Gr6goire Kayibanda, leader of the Hutu Social Movement party,
as its president.97 The Hutu, thus, became the governing party, hold-
ing thirty-five of the legislative seats while the Tutsi held only seven. 98
The Tutsi, who were exiled in the 1959 revolution, continuously made
incursions into Rwanda during this "First Republic," leading to "repri-
sals" against those Tutsi still living inside Rwanda.99 These reprisals
led to the deaths of tens of thousands of Tutsi, forcing many of those
not killed into exile.100 During Kayibanda's presidency, 101 a campaign
against the Tutsi was pressed so that power, money, and land once
belonging to the Tutsi was redistributed to the Hutu. Likewise, the
identification card system once used to discriminate against the Hutu
was now used against the Tutsi.10 2
The "Second Republic" of Rwanda was established in 1973 when
General Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, seized power from Kayibanda
through a military coup.10 3 From 1973 to 1990, there were no mas-
sacres under Habyarimana, though his administration implemented a
"policy of systematic discrimination" against the Tutsi.104 Haby-
arimana also outlawed all political parties except his own. 10 5 During
this stifling rule, "[v]iolent rumblings could be heard just below the
surface if one stopped to listen."'01 6 Evidence of these rumblings is
found in the formation of the Rwanda Patriotic Front ("RPF") by ex-
iled Tutsi and dissident Hutu. Habyarimana faced mounting pressure
from the international community to negotiate with the RPF regard-
ing the exiles' return to Rwanda.107 Shortly after Habyarimana finally
cal impossibility and that only about 450 Tutsi were killed. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 49-53,
53 n.19.
96. DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 43-44.
97. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 22.
98. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 53.
99. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 22. These Tutsi "commandos" seemingly did
not care about the consequences of their actions on the Tutsi civilians of Rwanda when carrying
out these terrorist acts. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 54.
100. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 22.
101. Kayibanda ruled the Republic as if it were a personal dictatorship in which the Hutu had
"unquestioning obedience" to him. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 57. In fact, it was this com-
plete dependence and obedience to Hutu leadership that, according to Prunier, led to the geno-
cide of the Tutsi. See id.
102. See DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 44.
103. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 22.
104. See DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 45.
105. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 76.
106. Id. at 82.
107. See DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 46.
2000]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
agreed to negotiate the formation of a constitution, though, the RPF
attacked Rwanda from Uganda on October 1, 1990.108 Though the
RPF was comprised of both Tutsi and Hutu, the Habyarimana govern-
ment viewed this attack as an attempt to reestablish Tutsi hegemony
and, therefore, called for the unification of the Hutu to defend against
the threat of the Tutsi.' 0 9 After the initial attack and subsequent re-
treat, the RPF switched tactics, adopting a "hit-and-run" strategy for
the next several years.I 10 The Hutu government responded with mas-
sive propaganda to incite the Hutu and encourage the killing of Tutsi
in Rwanda."'
The propaganda and sporadic massacres continued. On July 14,
1992, a cease-fire agreement was signed and peace talks began in
Arusha, Tanzania;'" 2 however, Habyarimana would not support any
peace agreements which would threaten his despotic reign.1 13 There-
fore, the violence and massacres continued while the Arusha peace
talks dragged on." 4 While the peace talks continued, two major
events set the eventual genocide of the Tutsi in motion. First, on Oc-
tober 21, 1993, the Hutu President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye,
was assassinated by Tutsi extremists, sharpening the Hutu fear of the
reestablishment of Tutsi domination. 1 5 This assassination led to a
"torrent of propaganda" professing fear of enslavement by the Tutsi,
"majority democracy," calls to action, and a renewed "paranoid vi-
sion" of the Hutu situation." 16 Second, on April 6, 1994, Habyarimana
108. See id. The RPF was made up of about 2,500 soldiers with Major-General Fred Rwigy-
ema as its leader. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 93. Rwigyema was killed on the second day of
the invasion, causing massive confusion for the troops. See id. at 94-96. The Rwandan regular
forces, supported by the Rwandan government, counterattacked, eventually leading to the
RPF's retreat around October 30, 1990, a month after the invasion had begun. See id. at 96.
109. See DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 46.
110. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 135. Attacks occurred in Ruhengeri, Bugogwe, Kanama,
Rwerere, Gisenyi, Bugesera, and Murambi. See id. at 135-39. By 1994, the RPF troops num-
bered nearly 25,000. See id. at 117.
111. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 24. In one instance, a report was broadcast on
the radio that a leaflet had been found calling on the Tutsi "to rise up and massacre their Hutu
neighbors." PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 137. This prompted the Hutu population to massacre
Tutsi under the guise of self-defense. See id.
112. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 150.
113. See id. at 162.
114. Four days after Habyarimana gave a radio address reinforcing his position to protect
himself, ethnic massacres began in Kibuye. See id. The Arusha Accords were signed on August
4, 1993. See DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 81. They "offered credible possibilities for national
reconciliation and peace for the majority of Rwandans at the expense of the ruling Hutu par-
ties." Id. at 28. After the Arusha Accords were signed, the "Hutu extremists decided on the
relentless pursuit of Tutsis and moderate Hutus." Id.
115. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 199. Ndadaye was elected in Burundi in June of 1993,
beating a Tutsi candidate. See id.
116. ld. at 200.
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was killed when his aircraft was shot down by a missile from an un-
known source.117 The Presidential Guard, believing the assassination
to be the work of the RPF, immediately began killing all Tutsi, any
Hutu known to oppose the President, and any persons opposing the
killings."1 8 With the encouragement of public authorities through ra-
dio propaganda,11 9 500,000 people, mostly Tutsi, were killed within
two weeks.12 0 Over the four-year period, from 1990 to 1994, between
800,000 and 850,000 Tutsi were killed. 121 This extended massacre is
the subject of the prosecutions at the ICTR.
B. Tribunals
1. International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, The
Hague, Netherlands
Bosnia-Herzegovina deteriorated quickly under the continuous on-
slaught of the Serbs. 122 Desperately seeking assistance, the Ambassa-
dor and Permanent Representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the
United Nations, Muhamed Sacirbey, wrote a letter to the Security
Council requesting intervention.1 23 The United Nations responded by
preparing a preliminary report regarding possible violations of inter-
national human rights law in Bosnia-Herzegovina 124 and creating an
117. See DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 31. Three theories were set forth by various sources just
after Habyarimana's death to explain what happened. The first theory, set forth by a Belgian
journalist, argues that Habyarimana's plane was brought down by the shots of French soldiers.
See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 213. This theory is unlikely, Prunier says, because the French
really had no interest in seeing Habyarimana dead considering he had been a French ally. See id.
at 214. The second theory, set forth by the Rwandese ambassador in Kinshasa, Tanzania, sug-
gests that Habyarimana's plane was gunned down by Belgian soldiers. See id. Again, this seems
unlikely because the Belgians had no interest in seeing him dead. See id. The third theory,
presented by several parties, claims that the plane had been shot down by the RPF. See id. at
215. Interestingly, though, as Prunier points out, eyewitnesses claimed that they saw white men
fleeing the scene of the shooting suggesting the culpability of someone other than the RPF. See
id. at 214.
118. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 25; see also PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 229.
231. During Akayesu's trial, a document, which was entered into evidence, separated the ene-
mies of the Hutu into two categories: (1) the primary enemy, or the extremist Tutsi who refused
to acknowledge the revolution of 1959 and wished to regain power; and (2) "anyone who lent
support in whatever form to the primary enemy." Akayesu Judgement, supra at 28.
119. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 231. Habyarimana's wife and her adviser appeared on an
extremist radio program claiming they had proof that Habyarimana's plane was shot down by
RPF terrorists. This alleged proof included tape recordings, photographs, and missile launchers
from an area under RPF control. See id. at 217.
120. See DESTEXHE, supra note 71, at 69.
121. See PRUNIER, supra note 24, at 265.
122. See Bland, supra note 10, at 239.
123. See id.
124. The preliminary report was prepared by a designated Special Rapporteur, Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, from Poland under Resolution 771. See id. at 240.
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impartial commission of experts to investigate the findings in the pre-
liminary report. 125 Four months after its establishment, the Commis-
sion of Experts ("Commission") 126 presented a report of its
investigation, recommending the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal
to prosecute its findings of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, 27 crimes against humanity in the form of ethnic cleansing,
possible war crimes, and genocide.1 28
The Security Council decided, pursuant to the Commission's find-
ings, to establish the ICTY. 129 On February 22, 1993, by adopting
Resolution 808, the Security Council formally committed to the crea-
tion of the ICTY. 130 The Secretary-General was then asked to pre-
pare a report regarding the ICTY's implementation. 131 Three months
after the adoption of Resolution 808, on May 25, 1993, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 827, the Tribunal's statute. 132 The Statute
of the ICTY was adopted pursuant to Chapter VI 1 33 of the Charter of
125. See id. The Commission of Experts was created pursuant to Resolution 780 after the
preliminary report concluded that there were "'massive and systematic violations of human
rights, as well as serious grave violations of humanitarian law."' Id.
126. The first five members of the Commission were Fritz Kalshoven (the first Chairman), M.
Cherif Bassiouni, professor of international law at DePaul University, Torkel Opsahl, human
rights professor at University of Oslo, William Fenrick, a Canadian war crimes expert, and Judge
Keba Mbaye of Senegal. See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 1 AN INSIDER'S GUIDE
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 26-27 n.102
(1995) [hereinafter 1 MORRIS & SCHARF]. After Opsahl died of a heart attack and Fritz Kal-
shoven resigned in 1993, M. Cherif Bassiouni became the Chairman, and the vacancies were
filled by Christine Cleiren, a professor of criminal law at Erasmus University in Rotterdam and
Hanne Sophie Greve, a Norwegian court of appeals judge. See id.
127. The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, promulgated in response to
World War I1, govern the rules of international humanitarian law during armed conflicts. See
generally INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, BASIC RULES OF THE GENEVA CON-
VENTIONS AND THEIR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS (1983) (detailing and explaining the Geneva
conventions).
128. See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 126, at 28-29. The Commission produced "65,000
pages of documents, a database cataloguing the information in these documents, over 300 hours
of videotape, and 3300 pages of analysis." M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in
Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV.
HUM. RTs. J. 11, 40 (1997) [hereinafter Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda]. To formulate its
investigative report, the Commission carried out 35 missions to the former Yugoslavia. See id.
at 41.
129. Formally, the International Tribunal "for the prosecution of persons responsible for seri-
ous violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia since 1991." 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 126, at 8.
130. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 54. Under Resolution 808, the Security Council simply
decided that an international tribunal would be established. See id.
131. See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 126, at 33-34.
132. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 62.
133. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter grants the Security Council strong and
"closely defined" powers unlike those granted to the General Assembly. See HENRY J. STEINER
& PHILIP' ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 121
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the United Nations, which allows the United Nations to take measures
to "maintain or restore international peace and security," following
the requisite determination of the "existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.' 34
a. Statute: Jurisdiction
A tribunal, to be effective, must be able to assert jurisdiction over
the conflict, the subject-matter, and the person. Also, it must deline-
ate the territory, and the time period over which it has jurisdiction.
The ICTY has jurisdiction over the Balkan conflict based on the 1949
Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols regarding in-
ternational armed conflict.' 35 Its subject-matter jurisdiction extends
to those crimes in violation of international humanitarian law which
have been established "beyond doubt" under customary law. 136 Gen-
erally, international law applies and affects States only, 137 however, a
new trend has developed pursuant to which individuals, because they
carry out the objectives of the State, can be held criminally responsi-
ble. 138 Therefore, the ICTY, under Article 6 of its Statute, asserts per-
sonal jurisdiction over those individuals who participate in the
"planning, preparation or execution of serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law."' 39 The exact territory over which the ICTY
(1996). Article 25 of the Charter mandates that members of the United Nations "agree to accept
and carry out" any determinations of the Security Council on these matters. U.N. CHARTER art.
25. By establishing the Tribunal under Chapter VII, the Security Council was able to expedite
the Tribunal's creation as well as making it immediately effective and binding on all States. See I
MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 126, at 42.
134. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. The Security Council, based on continual reporting, had already
determined that the "widespread violations of international humanitarian law" in the former
Yugoslavia was a threat to international peace. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, 2 AN
INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
8 (1995) [hereinafter 2 MORRIS & SCHARF].
135. The former Yugoslavia was party to the Geneva Conventions and the Security Council
on July 13, 1992, adopted Resolution 764, mandating that all those involved in the Yugoslav
conflict comply with these Conventions. 1 MORRIS & SCHARE, supra note 126, at 22.
136. See id. at 52. Confining subject-matter jurisdiction in this way allows for protection
against any person being prosecuted for a crime not clearly prohibited when it occurred. Also,
limiting jurisdiction in this way provides a legal standard to determine criminal responsibility
that is "beyond question." Id. The absence of such protections was one of the major criticisms
of the Nuremberg Trials. See Jose E. Alvarez, Rush To Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment,
96 MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2037 n.24 (1998).
137. Whereas domestic laws bind all people of that country, international treaties, which pri-
marily govern international law, have been historically held to bind only those parties to the
agreement-States. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 133, at 30-33.
138. See Antonia Sherman, Comment, Sympathy for the Devil: Examining a Defendant's Right
to Confront Before the International War Crimes Tribunal, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 833, 848
(1996).
139. Statute of the International Tribunal, Art. 6
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has jurisdiction is defined under Article 8 of the Statute as "the terri-
tory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including
its land surface, airspace and territorial waters."1t 40 As to temporal
jurisdiction, the ICTY only has jurisdiction over those crimes which
have occurred since January 1, 1991.141 Finally, according to Article 9,
the ICTY and national courts have concurrent jurisdiction, but the
ICTY has "primacy over national courts.' 42
b. Statute: Crimes and Organization
The ICTY Statute governs both the scope of the crimes that may be
tried as well as the organizational structure of the Tribunal itself.143
The Statute provides for the prosecution of three types of crimes: (1)
war crimes (Articles 2 & 3), which consist of grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions and violations of the laws or customs of war; 144
(2) crimes against humanity (Article 5), which include two groups-
(a) murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhu-
mane acts against any civilian population, and (b) persecutions on
political, racial, or religious grounds; 145 and (3) genocide (Article 4),
which means the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnic, racial or religious group" by "killing members of the group,"
''causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,"
"deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part," "imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group," or "forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.' 46
The Statute also provides an organizational structure for the Tribu-
nal. It stipulates the composition of the Tribunal's trial and appellate
Chambers (Article 12),'47 the election of a Tribunal president (Article
<http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm> [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
140. Id. at Art. 8.
141. See id. Even though the ICTY was established in 1993, it is interesting to note that its
jurisdiction extends to the 1999 massacre and exile of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo by the Serbs.
142. Id. at Art. 9. This is very much unlike the jurisdiction of the ICC which does not have
primacy over national courts. Rather, the ICC only has jurisdiction if a State Party or the Secur-
ity Council refers a situation to the Prosecutor or the Prosecutor initiates an investigation ac-
cording to the provisions of the Statute. See THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 46, art. 13 (compiled by M. Cherif Bassiouni 1998) [herein-
after STATUTE OF THE ICC].
143. See ICTY Statute, supra note 139, at Arts. 2, 3, 5, 12, 14, 16, 17.
144. See id. at Arts. 2, 3. The appropriate methods of warfare are detailed in the Geneva
Conventions and the Hague Convention. See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 126, at 10.
145. See 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 134, at 12.
146. Id.
147. See ICTY Statute, supra note 139, at Art. 12. The Trial Chamber consists of three judges
while the appellate Chamber consists of five judges. See id. The judges of the first Trial Chain-
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14), Chamber assignment and rotation procedures, and the responsi-
bilities of both the Prosecutor (Article 16) and the Registry (Article
17).148
2. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Arusha,
Tanzania
After receiving a report from the Commission on Human Rights of
the United Nations as to the "gravity of the Rwandan situation," the
Security Council, on June 30, 1994, adopted Resolution 935 establish-
ing an impartial Commission of Experts to investigate the violations
of international humanitarian law in Rwanda. a49 The Commission
recommended the creation of a criminal tribunal for Rwanda, similar
to the one in the former Yugoslavia and the Security Council subse-
quently adopted Resolution 955, establishing the ICTR. °50 Interest-
ingly, Rwanda, after urging intervention by the United Nations,
dissented from the creation of the ICTR for three reasons: (1) the
Tribunal's temporal jurisdiction was seen as insufficient; 151 (2) the pro-
cedural rules did not include the death penalty; 152 and (3) the ICTR
would neither use Rwandan judges nor hold trials in Rwanda. 153 The
Tribunal was created despite Rwanda's dissent.154
ber at the ICTY were Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, a former United States federal district judge,
Sir Ninian Stephen, a judge of the Australian High Court, and Lal Chand Vohrah, a senior high
court judge in Malaysia. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 112.
148. See ICTY Statute, supra note 139, at Arts. 14, 16, 17.
149. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 220. The Rwandan Commission of Experts was much dif-
ferent than the Commission of Experts for the Former Yugoslavia. The Rwandan Commission
had only three months to compile their report on the abuses in Rwanda, "spent only one week in
the field, and conducted no investigations." Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note
128, at 46.
150. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 221. The ICTR was formally named "International Tribunal
for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible
for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighboring states between
January 1 and December 31, 1994." Id. The judges of the first Trial Chamber for the ICTR were
Laity Kama, from Senegal, Lennart Aspegren, from Sweden and Navanethem Pillay, from South
Africa. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 1.
151. The Rwandans argued that by restricting the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal to
crimes committed after January 1, 1994, those who planned the crimes would be effectively ex-
cluded from prosecution. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 229.
152. See id. at 222.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 221. It has been suggested by M. Cherif Bassiouni that the establishment of the
ICTR in Tanzania does not represent a forum for the achievement of justice for the Rwandans
because they cannot, for the most part, go to Tanzania to see the criminals tried. Bassiouni
suggests that justice may only be possible if somehow conducted at a local level.
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a. Statute
The ICTR's jurisdictional requirements are the same as those of the
ICTY. Jurisdiction over the conflict, subject-matter, and persons are
all identical. The only differences, obviously, pertain to the territory
and time period covered. Territorial jurisdiction includes both
Rwanda and its neighboring states where Rwandan citizens commit-
ted genocide or other violations after January 1, 1994.155 Just like the
ICTY, the ICTR has concurrent jurisdiction with national courts but
has primacy over them. The ICTR provides for the prosecution of the
same crimes as the ICTY: war crimes (Article 4), genocide (Article 2),
and crimes against humanity (Article 3).
3. Rules of Procedure and Evidence: ICTY & ICTR
In order to develop the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the
ICTY's first two Trial Chambers' 56 "relied heavily on proposals from
the United States government," non-governmental organizations
("NGO's"), and other major legal systems in the world.' 57 The rules
adopted are in keeping with the common law more than its civil coun-
terpart, hence, the Tribunals primarily follow an adversarial model
rather than inquisitorial one. 158 The rules adopted to apply to the
ICTY and ICTR are broad, leaving much room for interpretation and
variation. This "generality indicates that the Rules are not intended
to be comprehensive," which, in turn, ensures that the "international
rules on evidentiary matters before the Tribunals can be developed
through their own decisions."' 59 The discretion of the Trial Chamber
to develop new rules within the context of an actual trial became
155. See id.
156. At its inception, the ICTY was comprised of two Trial Chambers. Judges Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald (United States), Rustan Sidwa (Pakistan), and Lal Chand Vohrah (Malaysia) made
up one Chamber while Adolphus Karibi-Whyte (Nigeria), Germain Le Foyer De Costil (France)
(later replaced by Claude Jorda, also of France), and Elizabeth Odio Benito (Costa Rica) com-
prised the other. See 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 134, at 646. Judge McDonald and Judge
Karibi-Whyte were both elected presiding judge of their respective Chambers. See id. After
serving one year, the judges would rotate among both Trial Chambers and the appellate Cham-
ber so as to vary the make-up of the individual Chambers. See id. This rotation system presents
some questions of fairness for a defendant who upon appealing her or his trial court decision has
the same judges for his appeal as she or he had at trial.
157. Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of Procedure & Evidence of the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 507, 508 (1994).
158. See id. The differences between common law and civil law systems have become blurred
over time, yet, in general, common law systems are usually "public, oral and adversarial" while
civil law systems are usually "secret, unilateral and written." Rod Dixon, Developing Interna-
tional Rules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 7 TRANSNA'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROus. 81, 96 (1997). See Bassiouni, Sources and Content, supra note 4, at 17.
159. Dixon, supra note 158, at 95-96.
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problematic in the Dusko Tadic trial, the first case heard before either
Tribunal. The evidentiary rules established in the Tadic trial created
the framework upon which future trials will be based.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Trial of Dusko Tadic
Dusko Tadic, a Serb, was born on October 1, 1955 in Kozarac,
Prijedor Bosnia.160 Kozarac was a predominantly Muslim community,
yet Tadic and his family remained there until 1991.161 He was well
known throughout the community, a fact that was apparent during the
testimony of the many witnesses at his trial who knew him as the man
who taught karate and managed a pub. 162 Tadic became involved in
the Bosnian conflict in 1990 when he joined the Serbian Democratic
Party ("SDS") and banned all Muslims from entering his pub. 163
Shortly thereafter, Kozarac, allegedly upon the suggestion of Tadic,
became the target of an artillery barrage by Serbs. 164 Of its "15,000
Muslim residents, 2,000 were killed in the artillery barrage. Another
5,000 were summarily executed after the town's surrender. ' 165 The
remaining Muslim residents were forced into concentration camps. 166
Tadic was alleged to have played a role in the execution and detention
of many of the Muslim residents of Kozarac. 167
After the seizure of Kozarac was completed, Tadic moved his family
to Munich, Germany, and several months later joined them there. 168
He and his family were among the more than 350,000 refugees from
Bosnia and Croatia who had taken refuge in Germany since 1992.169
Accusations about Tadic, known as "the Butcher," began to circulate
among refugees in Germany. 70 Tadic's presence was brought to the
attention of the German government, which subsequently launched an
investigation of all war criminals within its borders in response to ex-
160. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a/ "Dule," Opinion and Judgment at 180
<http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement-e/tad-tj970507e.htm#-toc387417230> [hereinaf-
ter Tadic Judgment].
161. See id. at 181.
162. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 94.
163. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 160, at 46.
164. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 95. This bombardment was allegedly undertaken because
the vast majority of the population was Muslim. See id.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See generally Tadic Indictment, supra note 67.
168. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 96.
169. See id. at 96-97.
170. See id. at 97.
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treme pressure brought to bear by human rights organizations. 171
Tadic was arrested on February 12, 1994, and indicted in Germany;172
however, the ICTY requested that his case be transferred for prosecu-
tion at the Hague.173 Mistakenly believing he had "a better chance of
acquittal at the Hague than in Germany," Tadic had no objections to
the transfer of his trial.1 74 Just over one year after his initial capture in
Germany, Tadic was indicted on February 13, 1995 on thirty-four
counts, including breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of
the laws and customs of war, and crimes against humanity. 175 It was
not until April 24, 1995 that Germany sent Tadic to the ICTY, where
he was held throughout his trial.176
After journalists were finally allowed into Bosnia to examine the
detention camps and interview victims, many believed it was clear that
the Serbs had engaged in genocide to destroy all Muslims and
Croats.177 It was quite interesting, therefore, that the ICTY chose as
its first defendant a man not charged with genocide. Due to various
procedural delays, Tadic's trial did not begin until May 7, 1996.178 In
all, 125 witnesses testified during the seven-month trial.179
B. The Trial of Jean Paul Akayesu
Jean Paul Akayesu was born in 1953 in Taba commune, Rwanda.180
For much of his life, Akayesu taught in the commune schools and
171. See id. at 96-97.
172. See id. at 97.
173. See id. at 98.
174. SCHARF, supra note 24, at 98. Scharf suggests Tadic's belief that he would have a better
chance at the ICTY was a "miscalculation" because other "Yugoslav war criminals who had been
tried by other European countries had managed quite well in the national courts." Id. These
other criminals included Dusko Cvjetkovic, a Serb, and Refic Saric, a Muslim, both of whom
were acquitted. See id. Scharf also suggests that because Tadic was the first criminal tried at the
ICTY, "much more was at stake." Id.
175. See Tadic Indictment, supra note 67, at 4.1-4.4.
176. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 101.
177. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 169 (asserting that genocide is "a sober description of the
Serbian rampage against the Muslims in the first six months of the Bosnian conflict").
178. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 111.
179. See id. at 205. The members of the prosecution were Lieutenant Colonel Brenda Hollis
of the Air Force Judge Advocate General's office, Grant Niemann, an attorney from Australia,
Alan Tieger, a United States attorney, and Major Michael Keegan of the Marine Corps Judge
Advocate General's office. See id. at 112. The defense team was headed by Michail
Wladimiroff, the "dean of the Dutch criminal defense bar" and partner at the biggest criminal
defense firm in the Netherlands. See id. at 102. Also defending Tadic were Alfons Orie, a part-
ner at Wladimiroff's firm and later a judge on the Dutch Supreme Court, Steven Kay, a British
barrister, and Sylvia de Bertondano, another British barrister. See id. at 102-03.
180. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 17. Rwanda is divided into 11 prefectures,
which are further subdivided into communes (similar to United States' cities divided into dis-
tricts). See id. at 18. The Taba commune is within the Gitarama prefecture. See id. at 4.
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eventually became Primary School Inspector in Taba. 18' This job en-
tailed "inspecting the education in the commune" and acting as "head
of the teachers." 182 Akayesu was a "well known and popular figure in
the local community" who became involved in the politics of Taba in
1991 when Rwanda returned to a multiparty system.183 He helped
bring a new political party to Taba called Mouvement D6mocratique
R6publicain ("MDR"), which was an extension of the 1957 "Hutu
grassroots movement" of the same name.184 The MDR's main focus
was the improvement of the commune's infrastructure, roads, schools,
hospitals, and electricity. It also undertook the controversial task of
highlighting the mistakes of the "Mouvement r~volutionnaire national
pour le d~veloppement" ("MRND"), the former "State-party" of
Rwanda. 185 Upon the emergence of the MDR, many Rwandans, des-
perate for change, left the MRND to join the new party, prompting
intense animosity between the parties.' 86 Because Akayesu was con-
sidered "a man of high morals, intelligence and integrity, possessing
the qualities of a leader," he was elected bourgmestre of Taba in
1993.187 Before the emergence of the multiparty system in Rwanda,
the bourgmestre had "sole responsibility and authority over the com-
munal police" and because he was considered a "trusted representa-
tive" of the State President, had "considerable sway over the
communal council.' 88 Though the introduction of the multiparty sys-
tem removed the bourgmestre's standing as the representative to the
president, he still remained "the most important local [representa-
tive]" within the commune. 189 Akayesu, therefore, had significant un-
official power within Taba during his term as bourgmestre from April
1993 to June 1994.190 He personally had oversight of the "economy,
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 17.
184. See id. at 22.
185. See id. This political party was instituted by President Habyarimana in 1975 as part of his
plan to transform Rwanda into a single-party system. See id. Upon birth, every Rwandan be-
came a member, "ipso facto," of the MRND. See id.
186. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 17.
187. Id. A bourgmestre governs each commune along with the communal council, which in-
cludes representatives of each sector of the commune. See id. at 18. Before the dissolution of
the single-party system, the bourgmestre acted as a representative to the central government, but
operated the commune as a "semi-autonomous unit." See id.
188. Id. at 18.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 17. Many of the witnesses who testified at Akayesu's trial affirmed the conten-
tion that Akayesu held substantial power. Witness "E" stated that "the bourgmestre was consid-
ered as the 'parent' of all the population whose every order would be respected." Id. at 20.
Similarly, Witness "S" said that "the people would normally follow the orders of the . . .
bourgmestre, even if those orders were illegal or wrongful." Id. Some witnesses, who were
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infrastructure, markets, medical care, and . . . social life." 191 Those
within his jurisdiction viewed Akayesu as a "father-figure," and there-
fore began to trust his administration.1 92
Jean Paul Akayesu was in a different position in Rwanda than was
Dusko Tadic in the former Yugoslavia. Akayesu was a leader, and as
such, provided a far more appropriate target for an accusation of the
promulgation of genocide. Because of his role as bourgmestre of
Taba, in which over 2,000 Tutsi were killed while he was in power,
Akayesu was charged with numerous counts of "genocide," "complic-
ity in genocide," "direct and public incitement to commit genocide,"
"extermination," "murder," "torture," "cruel treatment," "rape," and
"crimes against humanity."'1 93 Other than the genocidal extermina-
tion of Tutsi, which occurred all over Rwanda during the period cov-
ered by the ICTR, in Taba acts of sexual violence, beatings, and
murders were also common. Akayesu was deemed to have "facili-
tated the commission" of these crimes because he allowed them to
happen "on or near the bureau communal premises."'1 94 Besides pas-
sively facilitating the effectuation of crimes, Akayesu himself ordered
many of the beatings, killings, and acts of torture.195
Akayesu was arrested on October 10, 1995 in Zambia by authorities
there and was subsequently turned over to the Detention Facilities of
the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, on May 26, 1996.196 Akayesu's trial
began on January 9, 1997 after several procedural delays.197 The trial
lasted fourteen months, ending March 26, 1998, after the testimony of
forty-one witnesses-twenty-eight for the prosecution and thirteen,
including the defendant, for the defense. 198
former bourgmestres themselves, claimed that they had to operate "within the ambit of the law,"
conceding, however, that the "popularity of a bourgmestre might affect the extent to which his
orders and advice were obeyed within the Commune." Id.
191. See id. at 17.
192. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 18.
193. Id. at 6-8.
194. id.
195. See id. at 5. The examples in which Akayesu facilitated or ordered the commission of
criminal acts are abundant. After an incident in which a school teacher was killed for allegedly
associating with the RPF, made up of exiled Tutsi and dissident Hutu, Akayesu did not take
steps to have the killer, a Hutu, arrested. See id. Also, on April 19, 1994, Akayesu "urged the
population [of Taba] to eliminate accomplices of the RPF, which was understood by those pres-
ent to mean Tutsis." Id. Similarly, on several occasions, Akayesu ordered the torture and mur-
der of intellectual or influential people within Taba. See id.
196. See id. at 10-11.
197. See id. at 10-12.
198. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 13. The Prosecutors in the Akayesu trial were
Pierre-Richard Prosper, Honor6 Rakotomanana, and Yacob Haile-Mariam. See id. at 11.
Akayesu's attorneys were Nicolas Tiangaye and Patrice Month6. See id.
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C. Use of Anonymous Witnesses
One of the biggest evidentiary problems in the Tadic case arose
before it even began, and involved the use of anonymous witnesses. 199
The Trial Chamber of the ICTY granted a motion by the Prosecution
allowing for the admission of anonymous testimony by several wit-
nesses.200 Some of the witnesses' identities would remain unknown
not only to the public, but also to the accused and his attorney. 201 The
arguments for and against the propriety of anonymous testimony
center primarily on the tension between the protection of victims and
witnesses and the protection of the rights of the accused.202
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a
criminal defendant with the right "to be confronted with the witnesses
against him ... ",203 However, this right is often hedged by protective
measures to shield victims and witnesses during trials. It is frequently
the case in domestic trials that courts allow adult rape victims, for ex-
ample, to remain anonymous to the media and the public.20 4 Other
instances in the domestic setting in which certain witnesses' or victims'
identities are kept from the public include rape trials involving child
199. See, e.g., Monroe Leigh, Comment, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses
Against Accused, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235, 235 (1996) (contending that allowing anonymous testi-
mony denied the accused a fair trial and right to confront his accusers); Alex C. Lakatos, Note,
Evaluating The Rules of Procedure and Evidence For The International Tribunal In The Former
Yugoslavia: Balancing Witnesses' Needs Against Defendant's Rights, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 909, 918-
32 (1995) (arguing for the need of witness protection and the lack of an absolute right to con-
front accusers); Sherman, supra note 138, at 867-75 (asserting that testimony of an anonymous
witness hampers a defendant's ability to fully cross-examine or impeach that witness).
200. See Decision On The Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures For
Victims And Witnesses (Prosecutor v. Tadic), Case No. IT-94-1-T (Trial Chamber, Int'l.
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l. Humani-
tarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugo. since 1991, Aug. 10, 1995)
<http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895pm.htm> [hereinafter Decision on Protec-
tive Measures].
201. See id. at 29. Only one witness, "L" whose testimony will be later examined in great
detail, testified anonymously to the defendant and his counsel. See infra notes 279-297 and ac-
companying text.
202. See Lakatos, supra note 199, at 932-37; Leigh, supra note 199, at 235; Mercedeh Momeni,
Note, Balancing the Procedural Rights of the Accused Against a Mandate to Protect Victims and
Witnesses: An Examination of the Anonymity Rule of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 41 How. L.J. 155, 155, 156-57 (1997); Sherman, supra note 138, at 833-34.
203. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
204. See Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532, 1545 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that protection
against embarrassment of an adult witness in a rape trial was sufficient to require partial closure
of trial to the public); United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 1977)
(holding that excluding the public from courtroom was appropriate to protect an adult witness'
"dignity" during a rape trial); Aaron v. Capps, 507 F.2d 685, 687-88 (5th Cir. 1975) (permitting
rape trial to be closed to the public); Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 1966) (al-
lowing exclusion of spectators during the testimony of rape victim).
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witnesses, 20 5 trials involving minors as rape victims, 20 6 trials in which a
witness or her family is threatened, 207 trials using the testimony of un-
dercover agents, 208 and trials involving trade secrets. 209 The rationale
for these types of measures is threefold. First, they are necessary to
shelter those involved from exposure to public scrutiny. Second, they
seek to prevent "a second round of victimization as the witness 'runs
the gauntlet' of reliving a painful experience" in front of "an indiffer-
ent bureaucracy, an assaultive defense team, or an unsympathetic me-
dia."' 210 Finally, these measures may be deemed necessary to prevent
retaliation by a particularly menacing defendant. 211
The ICTY and ICTR provide similar protection to witnesses and
victims as that offered in domestic trials. Initial protection is afforded
through Article 22 of each Statute, which states that "[tihe Interna-
tional Tribunal shall provide in its rules of procedure and evidence for
the protection of victims and witnesses. Such protection measures
shall include, but shall not be limited to, the conduct of in camera
proceedings and the protection of the victim's identity. '212 Nominal
protection is also offered through the Victims and Witnesses Unit
("VWU"), established by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 213
The VWU was created to protect victims who are afraid to testify be-
cause of fear of retribution or exile from their communities.21 4 The
unit, however, had not received adequate funding from the United
Nations to render it fully operational at the time of the Tadic trial.215
Any mechanism designed to protect witnesses and victims should be
considered in light of the defendant's right to receive a fair trial, most
205. See Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151, 155 (9th Cir. 1958) (holding closure to the
public appropriate where child witness to rape testifies).
206. See United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that testi-
mony of minor rape victim outside hearing of defendant's family appropriate).
207. See United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1979) (allowing closure to
public where witness and his family were threatened).
208. See United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1274 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding
complete closure of courtroom to public appropriate to prevent disclosure of undercover agent's
identity).
209. See Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1974)
(holding complete closure of courtroom appropriate to protect against disclosure of trade
secrets).
210. Lakatos, supra note 199, at 911.
211. See id. at 910.
212. ICTY Statute, supra note 139, at Art. 22. Because the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR
are virtually identical, in this analysis, the ICTY Statute will only be cited, as it was drafted first
and provided the model for the ICTR's statute.
213. See ICTY R. OF P. & EvID. 34 <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32-rev15.htm> [here-
inafter ICTY Rules].
214. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 108.
215. See id.
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particularly by confronting his accusers. 216 Even the most scrupulous
examination of the Tribunals' Statutes together with their Rules of
Procedure and Evidence will disclose no solution to the anonymity
versus confrontation problem. As was mentioned above, Article 22 of
the Statute governs the protection of victims and witnesses. 217 The
key question is-from whom does the Statute envision these victims
and witnesses needing protection? 218 Does the Statute contemplate
protection from the defendant?219 If so, it may be objected that ano-
nymity undermines the defendant's right to confront his accusers, and
thus secure a fair trial.220 As to a fair trial, Article 21(2) of the ICTY
Statute protects that right; however, the provision also clearly states
that it is subject to the mandate of Article 22.221 Thus, the arguments
for and against the nondisclosure of a witness's identity to the defend-
ant become circular-the defendant's right to a fair trial is subject to
the protection of victims and witnesses, and the protection of victims
and witnesses is subject to the defendant's right to a fair trial.222 The
same circularity arises when considering a defendant's right to con-
front. 223 The more difficult question as to any right to confront, how-
ever, is whether it exists at all and if so, to what extent. The Statute
seemingly addresses this right in Article 21 when it states that "the
accused shall be entitled ... to examine, or have examined, the wit-
nesses against him .... -224 The Statute provides little or no guidance
as to what exact limitations may be placed on these rights in light of
the need to protect victims or witnesses. It might be argued that the
language leaves open the possibility of someone other than the de-
fendant, or defendant's counsel, questioning a witness. 225 The Statute
does not, however, provide any particular guidance as to what exact
216. See Leigh, supra note 199, at 236.
217. See ICTY Statute, supra note 139, at Art. 22.
218. See Leigh, supra note 199, at 236.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See ICTY Statute, supra note 139, at Art. 21(2).
222. A similar analysis is set forth by Antonia Sherman in reference to the circular argument
involved in resolving the tension between a defendant's right to confront his accusers and the
protection of victims and witnesses. See Sherman, supra note 138, at 835.
223. See id. (asserting the circularity of the argument).
224. ICTY Statute, supra note 139, at Art. 21(4)(e).
225. See Lakatos, supra note 199, at 923-24. Lakatos argues that because Article 21 also ex-
pressly guarantees a defendant's right to counsel, there would be no need for the Statute to
include "or have examined" if it were merely referring to defense counsel. See id. at 923. Coun-
sel's right to conduct an examination on behalf of the defendant is implied. Lakatos explains
that to interpret this language as excluding the possibility of someone other than the accused or
his counsel from examining a witness would render "to be examined" unnecessary. See id. Simi-




circumstances authorize the limitation of the confrontation right. It
becomes necessary, then, to look to other relevant sources for inter-
pretative assistance.
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide a tool to assist in the
resolution of the protection question, though not a completely conclu-
sive one. Rule 69(A) allows for the nondisclosure of a witness's iden-
tity "[i]n exceptional circumstances" until that witness is "brought
under the protection of the Tribunal. 2 26 The Rule adds in subsection
(C) that, subject to Rule 75, the identity of the witness or victim must
be "disclosed in sufficient time prior to the trial to allow adequate
time for preparation of the defence. '227 Rule 75(A) states that one
judge or the Chamber may "order appropriate measures for the pri-
vacy and protection of victims and witnesses .... ,,228 Rule 69(A)
seems to conflict with any reading of Article 22 to include the defend-
ant as one from whom identity can be kept, at least when the witness
has been taken under the protection of the Tribunal. 229 This is under-
scored by Rule 75(A)'s fiat that the protections granted witnesses
must remain "consistent with the rights of the accused. ' 230 Rule 75
also allows for an in camera proceeding to ascertain whether "meas-
ures to prevent disclosure to the public or the media of the identity or
whereabouts of a victim or witness" are needed.2 31 Given the explicit
mention of preventing disclosure to the public or media, the omission
of any reference to the defendant suggests that anonymity to the de-
fendant was not contemplated by the Rule. Finally, Rule 75(C) con-
fers on the Chamber the right to "control the manner of questioning
to avoid any harassment or intimidation" of a witness.2 32 This grant of
power indicates the Rule's cognizance of the chance that a witness
may be revictimized on the stand during cross-examination. 233 The
Rule does not, however, seem to consider that anyone other than the
defendant might be performing the cross-examination. Rules 69 and
75 together implicitly recognize a defendant's right to confront his ac-
cusers by acknowledging his need to prepare a defense. It is only by
226. ICTY Rules, supra note 213, at Rule 69(A). As with the statutes of the Tribunals, the
Rules of Evidence of the ICTY will only be cited in this section because they are the same as
those of the ICTR.
227. Id. at Rule 69(C).
228. Id. at Rule 75(A).
229. See Leigh, supra note 199, at 236-37.
230. ICTY Rules, supra note 213, at Rule 75(A).
231. Id. at Rule 75(B)(i).
232. Id. at Rule 75(C).
233. See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Radical Rules: The Effects of Evidential and Procedural Rules
on the Regulation of Sexual Violence in War, 60 ALB. L. REV. 883, 896 (1997) (arguing that Rule
75(C) helps protect the victim from revictimization on the stand during cross-examination).
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knowing the identity of the witnesses that the defense can prepare an
effective cross-examination. 234
Further authority as to a defendant's rights may be found in the
domain of international rules and norms. Such rights should be con-
sistent with "internationally recognized standards" drawn from cus-
tomary law and general principles of international law.235 The most
obvious places to look when considering these standards is the Nu-
remberg and Tokyo trials. Both Tribunals recognized confrontation
rights but with some limitations.236 At Nuremberg, for example, the
Tribunal often admitted ex parte affidavits, disallowing any cross-ex-
amination by the defense.237 Likewise, in the Tokyo trials, "reason-
able restrictions" on a defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses
were recognized. 238 A second source to examine is the other war
crimes Tribunals established by the Allied Powers after World War
11.239 A survey of these Tribunals, done by Alex C. Lakatos, indicates
that, as at Nuremberg, ex parte affidavits were used, though a defend-
ant had the right to cross-examine testifying witnesses. 240 Though the
ex parte affidavits utilized at Nuremberg and other Tribunals were not
anonymous, they do bridge the gap between an absolute right to con-
front and the severely limited right in operation when anonymous tes-
timony is admitted. Finally, of sixteen international instruments, also
surveyed by Lakatos, "only two explicitly protect the defendant's right
to confrontation. '241 It is clear from this examination of international
tribunals and instruments that little customary law exists governing
the right to confrontation. 242
234. See Leigh, supra note 199, at 236.
235. Lakatos, supra note 199, at 925. Customary law is "conduct, or the conscious abstention
from certain conduct, of states that becomes in some measure a part of international legal or-
der." STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 133, at 28. Customary law is traditionally made up of
three components: (1) general and consistent state practice; (2) which spans over time; (3) based
on a sense of legal obligation (or opinio juris). See id. at 28-29. One author has identified five
categories of general principles of international law: (1) "the principles of municipal law 'recog-
nized by civilized nations' "; (2) "general principles of law 'derived from the specific nature of the
international community'"; (3) "principles 'intrinsic to the idea of law and basic to all legal sys-
tems'"; (4) "principles 'valid through all kinds of societies in relationships of hierarchy and co-
ordination'"; (5) "principles of justice founded on 'the very nature of man as a rational and
social being."' OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 50 (1991).
236. See Lakatos, supra note 199, at 927-28.
237. See id. at 927.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 928.
240. See id.
241. Id. These two are the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the
American Convention on Human Rights. See id. at 929.
242. See Lakatos, supra note 199, at 929.
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Next, then, it must be determined whether there is a general princi-
ple of international law that governs the right to confrontation. In yet
another survey, Lakatos discovered that of 180 national constitutions,
only thirty-three explicitly granted a right to confrontation, and
mostly in generic terms.243 A general principle governing the right to
confrontation, therefore, could not be said to exist.244
Having exhausted all possible sources from which an answer might
be drawn, a resolution to the protection dilemma cannot be positively
established. However, it is clear that all the sources examined-the
Statute, the Rules, and international standards-do show some sensi-
tivity to claims regarding a defendant's right to confront. This right, it
is also agreed, can legitimately be limited in the interests of protecting
victims-no absolute confrontation right exists in any forum.2 45 The
question becomes, then, what types of restrictions would cause a de-
fendant's right to be unacceptably limited?
In the Tadic trial, the first to take place at the ICTY, the Trial
Chamber pushed the envelope concerning what limitations are accept-
able regarding the reception of anonymous testimony. The Prosecu-
tion brought a motion seeking to keep some victims' and witnesses'
identities not only from the public and media, but also from the ac-
cused and his counsel. It argued that these protective measures were
necessary to shield the witnesses and victims from "retraumatization"
caused by "confrontation with the accused. '246
The defense agreed to keep the identities of witnesses "P," '','
and "R" from the public and media. 247 It argued, however, that to
keep the identity of any witness from the defendant and his counsel
would deny him a fair trial, a right protected by Article 20 of the Stat-
ute. 248 The defense also stated that in order to adequately prepare for
the cross-examination of the witnesses and victims in question, it
needed, at least, their addresses.249 This argument is unsatisfactory
given that an address invariably leads to a name. The defense con-
tended, though, that it had "no interest in knowing the present where-
abouts of any of the pseudonymed witnesses. 250 It seems likely that
defense counsel had no extraneous interest in these matters. How-
ever, in an emotionally charged arena where horrifying accusations
243. See id. at 930.
244. See id. at 931.
245. See id. at 932.
246. Decision on Protective Measures, supra note 200, at 4-5.
247. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 133, 139, 156.
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were being made about the defendant, retribution by the accused or
his political allies was a real concern.2 5 1
The Trial Chamber declared that it would only bar anonymous testi-
mony if "the need to assure a fair trial substantively [outweighed] this
testimony. '252 The Chamber found that its duty to assure a fair trial,
which in this case was "substantially obviated by procedural safe-
guards," was not outweighed by the need to protect "genuinely fright-
ened" witnesses.253 It ruled, therefore, that it would allow the
testimony of witnesses "H," "J," and "K," all victims of sexual assault,
without their identities being disclosed to Dusko Tadic or his coun-
sel.2 54  The Chamber later granted this same protection to witness
251. See id. at 25
252. Id. at 26.
253. Id. Among the "procedural safeguards" referred to, the Chamber also outlined the fol-
lowing guidelines to insure fairness for the defendant: (1) the "[j]udges must be able to observe
the demeanour of the witnesses, in order to assess the reliability of the testimony"; (2) the
"[j]udges must be aware of the identity of the witnesses, in order to test the reliability of the
witness"; (3) "the defence must be allowed ample opportunity to question the witness on issues
unrelated to his or her identity or current whereabouts, such as how the witness was able to
obtain the incriminating information but still excluding information that would make the true
name traceable"; and (4) "the identity of the witness must be released when there are no longer
reasons to fear for the security of the witness." Id. at 22.
254. See Decision on Protective Measures, supra note 200, at 22. To arrive at its decision, the
Chamber relied on a five-prong balancing test. First, it decided, there must be a "real fear for
the safety of the witness or her or his family." Id. at 20. To meet this part of the test, the
Chamber applied an objective standard to decipher whether a witness's "fear for her safety" was
"legitimate and reasonable." Momeni, supra note 202, at 171. Second, "the evidence must be
sufficiently relevant and important to make it unfair to the prosecution to compel the prosecutor
to proceed without it." Decision on Protective Measures, supra at 21. The Prosecution was able
to fulfill this part of the test because many of its witnesses would not testify without a grant of
anonymity. Without these witnesses, the Prosecution would have no case because it relied al-
most exclusively on eyewitness testimony. See Momeni, supra at 165. This portion of the test
also raises the question as to how the judges can determine the relevance and quality of the
future testimony before hearing it. See id. at 173. The judges must determine the importance of
a witness's testimony based on what the prosecution tells them that testimony will entail. Third,
the Chamber "must be satisfied that there is no prima facie evidence that the witness is untrust-
worthy." Decision on Protective Measures, supra at 21. Under this part of the test, the Cham-
ber required that the Prosecution establish that the particular witness in question was veracious.
One of the problems with this requirement is that because the Prosecution often lacks the re-
sources to fully investigate a witness' background and determine whether any "ulterior motives"
exist, prejudice to the defendant may result if questionable motives are not discovered. See
Momeni, supra at 173. Fourth, there must be an "ineffectiveness or non-existence of a witness
protection programme." Decision on Protective Measures, supra at 21. This was perhaps the
most compelling reason to allow anonymous testimony in the Tadic case because the witness
protection program offered by the ICTY was insufficient. Therefore, "[rieleasing [the wit-
nesses'] identities may [have] [compromised] their testimony before the Tribunal and [deterred]
others from doing the same." Momeni, supra at 174. Finally, the Chamber found that "any
measures taken should be strictly necessary" so that "[i]f a less restrictive measure can secure the
required protection, that measure should be applied." Decision on Protective Measures, supra
at 21. This part of the test can be understood to mean that anonymity will only be granted under
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
"L," a former guard at the Trnopolje camp.255 After the Chamber's
ruling, defense attorney Michail Wladimiroff stated that though the
ICTY was "not a normal court" the defense would file for a mistrial
"if the accepted standards of fairness [were] violated. ' 256 Graham
Blewitt, the deputy Prosecutor at the ICTY, felt "'personally very un-
comfortable with the notion of going forward with witnesses whose
identity [sic] are not disclosed to the accused."257
Even anonymity proved insufficient security for one particular vic-
tim. Tadic was charged with the rape of a female prisoner at the
Omarska camp, identified only as victim "F."'258 As soon as the pro-
ceedings began, the rape charges were dropped because victim "F"
was too afraid to testify. 259 This seemed a clear indication that the
protective measures offered by the ICTY were perceived to be inade-
quate, at least by some witnesses. 260 Even with the prospect of testify-
ing completely anonymously to the accused and his attorneys, victim
"F" felt insecure. Such fears were far from irrational in light of the
lack of an ICTY police force or an operational witness protection pro-
gram to ensure her safety.261
Witnesses "P" and "Q" were not victims of Serbian crimes, but de-
sired anonymity from the public for fear of possible retribution when
they returned to their homes in Serbia. Witness "P" was the first
anonymous witness to testify, and began his testimony on May 30,
1996 in closed session.2 62 "P," a "Serb turncoat," testified in great de-
tail about the Serbian nationalist movement and the Serbian attack on
Prijedor Bosnia, revealing the specifics of Serb military action. 263 "P"
"exceptional circumstances." The Chamber stated that "[t]he situation of armed conflict that
existed and endures in the area where the alleged atrocities were committed is an exceptional
circumstance par excellence. It is for this kind of situation that most major international human
rights instruments allow some derogation from recognized procedural guarantees." Id. at 20.
Therefore, under the Chamber's reasoning, derogation from a defendant's right to confront his
accusers was appropriate in light of the exceptional circumstances in which the Tadic trial was
taking place.
255. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 108.
256. Id. at 109.
257. Id. at 108.
258. See Tadic Indictment, supra note 67, at 4.1.
259. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 113.
260. This was also a major setback for international law in general because of the hope that
this trial would "[confirm] that rape is an international crime" and that proof of this charge of
rape would lead to the establishment of a record that the Bosnian Serbs used rape as a form of
genocide it their attempts to destroy the Muslim and Croat populations. Id.
261. See Momeni, supra note 202, at 166 (arguing that in the Tadic case the Tribunal could not
protect its witnesses).
262. See Testimony of witness "P" <http://www.un.org/icty/transel/960530RD.txt>.
263. See Testimony of witness "P" at 27-30 <http://www.un.org/icty/transel/960531RD.txt>.
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also told of Tadic's political role within Kozarac.264 Witness "Q," a
Muslim who tried to guard Kozarac institutions against Serbian take-
over, testified behind closed doors, on June 12th, that he had wit-
nessed Tadic marking Muslim targets with flares during the Serb
attack on Kozarac. 265 The importance of granting anonymity to these
witnesses is quite clear. It is unlikely "P" or "Q" would have testified
at all absent this protection because they would go home as targets for
violence. Without witnesses like them, it would have been very diffi-
cult for the Prosecution to prove that atrocities in Kozarac were, in
fact, Serb-initiated strikes on Muslims. 266
Witness "R," a Muslim Omarska survivor, testified on July 16th in
the courtroom, but behind screens so as to be concealed from the gal-
lery.267 He testified that while he was at Omarska, prisoners around
him once pointed to a man leaving the white house (known to be the
place where dead bodies were stored and where "interrogations" or
beatings occurred) and said, "'That is Dusko."' 268 "R" stated that he
recognized the man as Tadic immediately because of photographs he
had once seen of Tadic in a weekly newspaper, Kozarski Vjesnik,
when the defendant was a karate instructor.2 69 Because "R" testified
that Tadic had come from behind the white house, where "R" had
been a witness to several deadly beatings, it became apparent that
Tadic was not only present at Omarska, but that he also knew about
the massive killings taking place there. 270 The grant of anonymity
from the public, here, is untroubling, given that it comports with the
general goal of anonymity in domestic trials and the ICTY's Statute
and Rules of Evidence affording some protection to witnesses and vic-
tims to guard against retribution. Without such protection, "R" may
have been the target of further violence for helping convict a Serb.
The real controversy arose with respect to the testimony of victims
64H,1" 6"J," "K," and "L." The identities of these victims were, initially,
not to be disclosed to the public, as well as to the defendant. Victim
264. See Testimony of witness "P" at 2 <http://www.un.org/icty/transel/960604RD.txt>.
265. See Testimony of witness "Q" at 16-17 <http://www.un.org/icty/transel/960611RD.txt>.
"Q"'s testimony was not actually revealed until closing arguments. See SCHARF, supra note 24,
at 139.
266. In order for the ICTY to have jurisdiction over the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the
Prosecution had to prove the existence of an "international conflict." See SCHARF, supra note
24, at 120. In future cases, the Tribunal is likely to try Serbs for genocide, in which case testimony
from Serbs themselves might be helpful.
267. See id. at 156.
268. See Testimony of witness "R" at 29 <http://www.un.org/icty/transel/960717it.DOC>
[hereinafter Testimony of "R"].
269. See id. at 30.
270. See id. at 32-33.
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"H" was involved in the so-called "castration incident" in which he
and a man, identified only as "G," were allegedly forced to castrate
Fikret Harambasic upon orders by Serbs, including Tadic. 27 1 "H," a
Muslim and former karate student of Tadic, testified that he was or-
dered to "lick the arse" of Harambasic. 272 After he did this, he testi-
fied, "G" was ordered to first "suck Harambasic's penis" and then
"bite his testicles" off.273 At this point, it seemed the Prosecution was
very close to proving one of the main charges in the indictment-that
Tadic had participated in the castration and murder of Harambasic,
and was therefore guilty of a "grave breach," violations of the laws or
customs of war, and a crime against humanity.2 74 In a question that
would have settled Tadic's guilt, the Prosecutor, Michael Keegan,
asked "H," "Was the defendant there during the incident?" To the
surprise of many observers in the courtroom, "H" said, "No. '275 This
was a devastating blow to the Prosecution's case and on cross-exami-
nation, "H" testified that he had never even seen Tadic at the Omar-
ska camp at all.2 76 According to Michael Scharf, Michael Keegan
described this mishap, later, as stemming from translation problems
from Serbo-Croatian to English. 277 Keegan's explanation does not re-
ally seem likely, though, and suggests inadequate investigation of
"H"'s story. After the fight the defense had put up regarding the
anonymous testimony of witnesses, "H"'s testimony did not seem to
have hurt the defense at all, and may have even helped it.278
Witness "L," who was to be the Prosecution's "star witness" in at-
tempting to prove the allegations against Tadic in Count One of the
indictment, testified anonymously to the defendant and his counsel in
order to protect himself and his family from possible reprisals. 279 As a
former guard at the Trnopolje camp, "L" testified that Tadic "was one
271. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 160-61.
272. See Testimony of witness "H" <http://www.un.org/icty/transel/960724it.htm> [hereinafter
Testimony of "H"].
273. Id.
274. See Tadic Indictment, supra note 67, at 5.20-5.25.
275. See Testimony of "H," supra note 272.
276. See id.
277. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 162. One could argue, as Michael Keegan did to me in a
personal conversation, that "H" was called only to prove the horrific acts that occurred during
the "castration incident" and that Tadic's connection to those acts were not to be proven until
later, through the testimony of Hussein Hodzic. See supra Part II.D.2.
278. In its final judgment, the ICTY found that Tadic was present during the incident involv-
ing the castration of Fikret Harambasic, but that he did not actively participate. See Tadic Judg-
ment, supra note 160, at 59-60. This mishap with "H" was later partially rehabilitated through
the testimony of Hussein Hodzic, which is addressed in the hearsay section of this Comment.
See supra Part II.D.2.
279. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 171-72.
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of the armed [sic] who was a Commander in the camp at Trno-
polje. '' 280 At this point in his testimony, witness "L" looked particu-
larly promising for the prosecution, mostly because he was able to
place Tadic at the Trnopolje camp.
During the rest of his testimony, "L"'s story seemed to get better
and better for the Prosecution. "L" testified that on numerous occa-
sions, while at Trnopolje, he was told to follow Tadic and three other
guards, Milan Cavic, Bosko Dragicevic, and Zoran Karajica, into the
basement of a cellar after they had taken a young female prisoner
from the white house where the prisoners were kept. Once there,
each guard would take a turn raping the victim while his companions
held her down.28' "L" testified that on several occasions he was or-
dered to undress and was then pushed down on top of a girl while
Tadic and the others stood by laughing. 282 "L" also claimed that dur-
ing some of these incidents Tadic threatened the girls, telling them "he
would kill [them], that he would slit [their] throat[s] if [anyone at the
camp] ever learned . .. what had happened to [them]. ' 283 "L" also
recalled an incident in which Tadic, after raping one girl, directed her
and a second girl to "beat each other" so that the other prisoners
would not know what had really happened to them.284 "L" testified
that Tadic himself shot two Muslim inmates in the head with a pistol
and ordered "L" to kill eight others by firing three bullets into each
prisoner.285
After recounting many other horrific occurrences explicitly involv-
ing Tadic, "L" stated that he, a member of the Bosnian Serb forces
since December of 1992, had been shot and captured by the Muslim-
led Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina on October 20, 1994.286 The impor-
tance of this particular part of "L"'s testimony was not realized until
just before the defense rested its case months later when the Prosecu-
tion announced that witness "L" had lied in his testimony that Tadic
had committed atrocities at Trnopolje. 287 It was discovered through
the inquiries of Tribunal investigator Robert Reid, that upon his own
admission, "L," whose actual name was Drago Opacic, has been "or-
280. See Testimony of witness "L" at 36 <http://www.un.org/icty/transel/960813RD.txt>
[hereinafter Testimony of "L" I].
281. See id. at 41-42.
282. See id. at 42.
283. Id.
284. Testimony of witness "L" at 6 <http://www.un.org/icty/transe1/960814RD.txt> [hereinaf-
ter Testimony of "L" Ill.
285. See id. at 9.
286. See id. at 15.
287. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 199.
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dered by Bosnian Muslim authorities" to testify as he did, or face exe-
cution.288 The first time Opacic had ever seen Tadic was on a video
shown to him by Muslim officials in Sarajevo, Bosnia.2 89
One of the defense's most persuasive arguments against the use of
anonymous testimony was that there was no way for the defense to
investigate a witness's background or to demonstrate prejudice in such
circumstances. 290 The defense was precluded in just this manner from
any attempt to impeach the truthfulness of Drago Opacic. The impli-
cation of the Chamber's decision to allow completely anonymous tes-
timony here is very clear-but for a stroke of luck, Dusko Tadic's
defense would have been unfairly prejudiced. Tadic's attorney
claimed that had Opacic's lies not been uncovered, "Tadic would
likely have been convicted on the strength of Opacic's statement. '291
The propriety of the Chamber's decision to allow witnesses to tes-
tify anonymously must be examined in light of what transpired at the
trial. It is true that the Chamber did not have the benefit of hindsight
in determining how to best protect the witnesses and victims who
could help convict Tadic; however, it is also true that even without this
benefit, the Chamber neglected to consider crucial factors available
during the trial. Upon reading the testimony of Drago Opacic (wit-
ness "L"), particular language patterns arise, which, had they been
carefully scrutinized, may have unveiled his fabrications. Throughout
his testimony, Opacic seemed to have had no trouble answering any of
the questions he was asked about himself or general background in-
formation. When asked these types of queries, he responded pre-
cisely, often repeating the Prosecutor's language in his answer. 292
As soon as the questions turned to the involvement of Tadic,
though, Opacic's answers became less certain and he began to falter,
frequently asking the Prosecutor to repeat or rephrase his questions.
It is certainly true that Opacic's problems with the Prosecutor's ques-
tions could have resulted from difficulties in translation. However,
while some questions seemed linguistically difficult for Opacic to an-
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 200.
291. Id.
292. For example, the Prosecutor asked, "Did you join the army?" and Opacic confidently,
without apparent problems understanding, said, "No, I was not in the army." Testimony of "L"
1, supra note 280, at 34. Similarly, the Prosecutor asked, "Do you know where the supplies of
humanitarian aid were coming from that were being distributed?" Opacic answered, "As far as I
knew, it was brought over from Prijedor, but it was brought in by the United Nations." Id. at 35.
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swer,293 others, like those regarding Tadic's physical characteristics
(which Opacic could have more easily ascertained from the video tape
he was shown) appeared simple.294 In most instances where Opacic
stumbled with his answers, it appears from reading the transcript that
translation was not his most significant problem. Rather, it seems that
Opacic was laboring to create a fiction about Tadic's involvement.
Throughout his testimony, when the Prosecutor asked Opacic who
participated in the criminal behavior to which he was referring,
Opacic listed the names of those involved, always mentioning Tadic
last, almost as an afterthought. For example, when asked, "Did you
see who it was that took [the girl] out?" Opacic responded, "I cannot
remember, but there were Bosko Dragicevic, Zoran Karajica, Milan
Cavic and Dusko Tadic were [sic] there. ' 295 Opacic continuously re-
sponded this way, always adding Tadic at the end.296 At other times,
Opacic seemingly forgot to mention Tadic at all until specifically
asked:
QUESTION: When you got to the basement what did you see?
ANSWER: We saw the girl, Zoran Karajica and Cavic.
QUESTION: Did you see Tadic at this stage?
ANSWER: Tadic was there too.2 9 7
Given that Opacic was a witness for the prosecution of Tadic, why,
when asked such a direct question, would he respond confidently as to
who was present, but not mention Tadic until after being specifically
asked whether he was there?
Opacic attributed the most horrific behavior to Tadic, and seem-
ingly could have convicted Tadic by himself. It should be clear that
when a defendant like Tadic is denied any opportunity to discover
293. During one exchange, the Prosecutor inquired about the time Opacic was introduced to
Tadic while Tadic distributed humanitarian aid cards to Serb refugees, "For how long were you
at the premises on this day, do you remember, approximately?" Opacic answered, "Sorry, you
were in the house-we were receiving the humanitarian aid." Id. at 36.
294. The Prosecutor asked, "Can you describe what you remember of his physical appearance
on that day?" Opacic, without apparent hesitation, answered, "He was clean shaven, clean, big.
He had civilian clothes. He had black hair, curly with sideburns ... He was not armed." Id.
295. Testimony of "L" II, supra note 284, at 3.
296. For example, when asked "Who led these men out of the camp?" Opacic answered,
"They were Dragicevic, Zoran Karajica and Cavic, and Dusko Tadic arrived." Id. at 10 (empha-
sis added). Also, when asked "Did you see who it was that was leading them out of the build-
ing?" Opacic responded, "There was Zoran Karajica, Cavic, Bosko Dragicevic and then Dusko
Tadic arrived." Id. at 11 (emphasis added). Finally, when asked "What did they do with these
old men when they led them out of the co-operative?" Opacic said, "They were taken out of the
co-operative building and taken towards the railway. The police went along with them and
Dusko Tadic also." Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
297. Id. at 43.
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possible ulterior motivations because of anonymity granted to a wit-
ness, like Opacic, that defendant is likely to be denied a fair trial. Be-
cause there was other strong evidence to convict Tadic, the impact of
allowing anonymous witnesses was not as detrimental as it might have
been. The decision to allow this type of testimony, though, could at
any time produce profoundly unfair results. In future Tribunal cases,
reliance on anonymous testimony, where other evidence is not as
strong, may result in a serious miscarriage of justice.
It is true that the Trial Chamber, in applying its guidelines for ensur-
ing a fair trial for the defendant, 298 is empowered to give whatever
weight it deems appropriate to anonymous testimony. A foreseeable
problem arises, though, when the testimony in question involves mul-
tiple translations, as it did in Tadic. The Chamber could believe in-
credible answers to be merely an issue of translation, rather than an
indication of deceit. Likewise, if ulterior motives are present, but
never revealed due to inadequate inquiries by the Prosecution, or the
inability of the defense to conduct any discovery into the witness's
background, there is the potential for a wrongful conviction.
In the Akayesu trial, the Trial Chamber permitted the vast majority
of witnesses to testify behind screens so that their identities would be
kept from the public.299 Both witnesses for the Prosecution and the
defense (many of whom were refugees living in other countries) testi-
fied this way. 300 However, no witnesses testified anonymously to the
defendant or his counsel. 30' This clearly suggests something about the
decision made by the Trial Chamber in the Tadic case. It may indicate
that the ICTR disagreed with the decision of the ICTY and decided
not to follow such drastic steps. The more likely explanation, though,
seems to be that the ICTR had much better protective measures in
1997 than did the ICTY in 1995. When witnesses came to the ICTR to
testify, accommodations were provided so they could stay in "safe
houses where medical and psychiatric assistance was available. '302
This is decidedly different from the protections offered by the ICTY.
There, each witness was on his or her own in terms of physical safety
and the psychological stress of testifying. It is unclear whether the
ICTR's additional protective measures were implemented in response
298. See supra note 253 (discussing the procedural safeguards to ensure a fair trial).
299. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 12. The transcripts for Akayesu's trial were
not yet available at the time this Comment was written; therefore, the analysis of the relevant
issues is based on the judgement and opinion issued by the ICTR.
300. See Bernard Muna et al., The Rwanda Tribunal and its Relationship to National Trials in
Rwanda, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1469, 1478-79 (1998).
3)1. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 12.
302. Id. at 31.
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to the inadequate procedures at the Hague, as a means of avoiding a
controversial decision similar to the one made by the ICTY, or simply
without any specific concerns about the ICTY at all.
It is likely that with the passage of time both Tribunals will realize
the increasing importance of protective measures for victims and wit-
nesses. This is especially true the more frequently officials, like
Akayesu, are tried. Because higher officials presumably have more
power, fear of retribution may be exacerbated so that greater protec-
tion is necessary. The justifications for effectuating a better witness
protection program surely apply as forcefully to the ICTY as to the
ICTR.
Proposed Solutions for the Anonymous Witness "Problem"
Because of the problems associated with the use of anonymous tes-
timony, other measures must be adopted to ensure the protection of
victims and witnesses who testify before international tribunals.
There seemed to be no acceptable solutions to the dilemma faced by
the Trial Chamber of the ICTY. Even those proposed in what follows
present seemingly insurmountable barriers to a comfortable resolu-
tion of the tension between the protection of witnesses and the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial. Possible solutions must be considered by
separating witnesses into two groups: (1) those who are afraid to tes-
tify because they do not want to re-live the trauma they have exper-
ienced; and (2) those who are afraid to testify because of possible
retribution. First, for those who fear being "revictimized" on the
stand, several safeguards can be implemented. For example, the Trial
Chamber could be empowered to collect lists of proffered questions
before the examination of the potential witness.30 3 In this way, the
judges could antecedently control the inquiries made by the defense
attorney and "strive to minimize the psychological trauma" that ac-
companies testifying. 304 This solution, however, curtails the discretion
of the defense attorney, derogating from standard adversarial proce-
dures.30 5 There is something disquieting about a forum that requires
303. See Lakatos, supra note 199, at 936-37; see also Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694
(1931) (holding that trial court has a duty to protect witnesses from questions which "go beyond
the bounds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or humiliate").
304. Lakatos, supra note 199, at 919.
305. Any derogation from such adversarial procedures is not troublesome in many respects




the approval of each prospective question by a judge before the con-
tent of a witness's testimony is clear.30 6
Second, the ICTY's VWU could be vitalized so that those testifying
actually feel secure, as in the case of the ICTR. To do this, steps must
be taken to guarantee that witness participation is consented to, rather
than coerced.30 7 Witnesses should be permitted to have loved ones
present at the Tribunal and suspend their testimony if it becomes too
difficult to continue. 30 8 This approach seems viable, but if a witness
begins to testify and then decides it is too painful, prejudicial material
may be exposed that will not be subject to cross-examination, and val-
uable time may be wasted in trials that already take too long. Yet the
effort may be worthwhile because under the protection of these safe-
guards, more victims may be willing to bring their perpetrators to jus-
tice. Moreover, their experiences may encourage others to come
forward to tell their stories as well.
For those witnesses afraid of possible retribution, one solution is to
offer them asylum and a new identity in another country.30 9 A wit-
ness, by accepting this offer, could testify openly, yet remain certain
that she would be protected from retribution. The problem with this
offer, though, is that many of the witnesses have families subject to
retribution as well. The proffer of asylum and a new identity does
nothing for those who are left behind. Similarly, a witness may not be
willing to leave his family for a new country even if it does mean
bringing a war criminal to justice.
Another solution, applicable to both types of witnesses, and one
that might be the most practical, is to allow the Trial Chamber to hear
anonymous testimony and then "strike [it] from the record and disre-
gard" it if the defendant's right to a fair trial is in jeopardy. 310 This
approach might have been utilized in the Tadic trial had Opacic's
background never been revealed since the Chamber had reserved its
right to give only appropriate weight to anonymous testimony. 311
However, there is a real problem in requiring judges to forget what
they hear after they have heard it. To disregard extensive testimony
306. This solution may be more acceptable if the question list is not shown to the witness
beforehand. In this way, the witness would not be allowed to prepare for cross-examination and
have time to fabricate her or his answers.
307. See Lakatos, supra note 199, at 937.
308. See id. at 937-39.
309. See Leigh, supra note 199, at 237.
310. Id.
311. See Decision on Protective Measures, supra note 200, at 22.
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about the commission of horrific acts would be extremely difficult
even for experienced judges.312
A final possible resolution of the tension between the defendant's
rights and the protection of witnesses is to appoint a "devil's advo-
cate." This specially appointed advocate would stand in the place of
the defense attorney to conduct interviews of witnesses and victims
who fear revealing their identities. He or she might also make inquir-
ies into the reliability of the potential witness's testimony. Because a
Tribunal investigator, Robert Reid, helped to unveil the fabrications
of Drago Opacic,313 there is a strong indication that the United Na-
tions-established Tribunal may be in a uniquely effective position to
undertake such an approach. Therefore, the ICTY could appoint a
neutral attorney who would explore the backgrounds and current
whereabouts of victims and witnesses independently of the Prosecu-
tion's investigators. In this way, the defense could be assured that the
testimony given anonymously was less likely to have been coerced by
the Prosecutors or outsiders.
There is no easy solution to the dilemma of simultaneously protect-
ing vulnerable victims and witnesses and ensuring a fair trial for the
defendant. There are, however, many steps that must be taken to im-
prove the current situation at both the ICTY and ICTR. Improve-
ment of witness protection is obviously one of them, yet the others
suggested above can help to improve the entire process from the be-
ginning. Allowing witnesses to testify without having their identities
revealed to the public is certainly acceptable given the unsettled polit-
ical situations in both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Testimony
which is anonymous to the defendant and his counsel, however,
presents a variety of problems, addressed in the Tadic analysis, that
just do not seem soluble.
D. Admittance of Hearsay Evidence
The admission of hearsay evidence, also, can severely limit a de-
fendant's right to confront. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement of-
fered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.314 In
adversarial systems, hearsay evidence is generally deemed unreliable,
312. See Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Inquiry into
the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV.
Sci. & L. 113, 120-26 (1994) [hereinafter Landsman & Rakos, Biasing Information on Judges and
Jurors] (conducting an experiment which shows the difficulty of both judges and juries in disre-
garding testimony after it is given).
313. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 199.
314. FED. R. EvID. 801.
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and thus inadmissible. This view is exemplified by the United States'
Federal Rules of Evidence prohibition of hearsay evidence unless it
falls within one of the enumerated exceptions. 315 Hearsay evidence is
deemed unreliable because it is usually unsworn, vulnerable to error
in its "oral transmission," and impervious to cross-examination. 316
Also, the "hearsay declarant's demeanor while speaking" cannot be
observed by the factfinder, thus inhibiting scrutiny of credibility. 31 7
The idea behind the hearsay rule is to "protect lay jurors from poten-
tially misleading information. '318 It is thought that if exposed to hear-
say evidence, the naive jury will give undue weight to what an
experienced judge would know to be dubious testimony. Inquisitorial
legal systems have neither rules against the admission of hearsay evi-
dence nor juries.319 The argument supporting this approach is that
because a judge has years of experience, she will, unlike a juror, be
able to identify and disregard such untrustworthy testimony.320
When the legal principles of both the adversarial and inquisitorial
models were considered in the promulgation of the Tribunals' Rules
of Evidence, the inquisitorial paradigm clearly won out with regard to
hearsay evidence.32' The Tribunals' rules do not address hearsay evi-
dence, probably because the Tribunals are comprised of professional
judges rather than lay jurors. The only Tribunal rules remotely rele-
vant to hearsay are 89(C) and 89(D). Rule 89(C) states: "A Chamber
may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative
315. The hearsay rule reads: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of
Congress." FED. R. Evir. 802. Rules 803 and 804 govern the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
See FED. R. EviD. 803, 804.
316. See RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF
SCIENCE AND STATUTES 437 (4th ed. 1997).
317. Id.
318. Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Empirical En-
quiry Concerning the Prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 65, 65 (1991).
319. Countries that have inquisitorial legal systems include France, Spain, Russia, and many
others.
320. See Landsman & Rakos, Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors, supra note 312, at
113.
321. This is so because there is no hearsay rule in the ICTY or ICTR's Rules of Evidence. As
previously explained, two legal systems, civil and common law, were combined and compro-
mised to create the rules that govern the ICTY and ICTR. See supra note 158 and accompany-
ing text. The civil system is also referred to as the inquisitorial model. In this type of legal
system, the evidence is first presented to a magistrate judge, who compiles that evidence in a
dossier. See TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 63. This compilation, if sufficient for prosecution, is then
given to the trial court and the defendant. See id. During the actual trial, the judges ask ques-
tions of the witnesses. In fact, cross-examination often does not occur. See id. Also, the defend-
ant is not permitted to testify under oath, "but may make an unsworn statement to the court."
Id.
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value. '322 Rule 89(D) reads: "A Chamber may exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a
fair trial. '323 Because the decisionmakers at the ICTY and ICTR are
experienced judges, the admission of hearsay evidence should not,
theoretically, present any problems. However, problems did arise be-
cause much of the evidence presented in both the Tadic and Akayesu
trials was eyewitness testimony interspersed with hearsay evidence-
all of which was invariably admitted.324
Two types of hearsay evidence will be examined below: (1) the testi-
mony offered by an "expert" witness in the Tadic trial based primarily
on compiled interviews and newspaper articles, and an expert in the
Akayesu trial; and (2) the testimony of lay witnesses identifying the
accused after his having been pointed out by an absent declarant.
Both types of hearsay evidence present reliability problems because
they are based on out-of-court statements not amenable to cross-
examination.
1. Expert Testimony
In the Tadic and Akayesu trials, expert witnesses were called to
demonstrate the existence of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugosla-
via, and genocide in Rwanda, respectively. The problem with this
type of evidence is that it is "'based on second, third, and even fourth-
hand testimony"' of victims and witnesses. 325 The use of experts as
hearsay conduits326 renders usually inadmissible evidence admissible
and legitimates apparently unreliable out-of-court statements. Be-
cause the Tribunals do not bar hearsay evidence, it can be argued that
expert testimony based on victim interviews is perfectly acceptable.
The judges, in theory, will be able to discern when the out-of-court
statements are reliable and when they are not.
The problem, though, is that the various arguments for the admis-
sion of hearsay tend to break down when concerned with expert wit-
nesses. For example, when a lay witness takes the stand and testifies
322. ICTY Rules, supra note 213, at Rule 89(C).
323. Id. Rules 89(C) and 89(D) are similar to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
which states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
324. Specific instances in which hearsay evidence was admitted will be discussed in detail be-
low. See infra notes 325-414 and accompanying text.
325. SCHARF, supra note 24, at 128. In Tadic, Hanne Sophie Greve testified to the ethnic
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. See id.
326. See Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation Abuses in Opinion
Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 859, 859 (1992).
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as to what he or she heard an individual say, the judges have at least
some chance of determining the trustworthiness of his or her testi-
mony based on the context in which the conversation took place.
However, the likelihood of a judge determining the veracity of hear-
say statements brought in through a witness clothed in the mantle of
expertise, who testifies as to what hundreds of victims told her, is min-
iscule. There seems no practicable way for judges to ascertain the reli-
ability of the victims' statements. Generally, it is argued that it is the
expert's skills which render the hearsay he or she relies on admissi-
ble.327 Even this argument falters, though, if the "expert" does not
have the necessary skills, as was the case in Tadic. Also, because the
expert is deemed to be a professional, the judges may, even if subcon-
sciously, assign undue weight to this less than dependable portion of
the expert's opinion.
Another problem with the expert testimony in Tadic was a linguistic
one. The expert in Tadic did not personally conduct the interviews of
the witnesses and victims about which she testified.328 Rather, other
officials conducted the interviews and then reported their findings to
her. The language of the people being interviewed was Serbo-Croa-
tian 329 while the interviewers spoke different languages depending on
what country they were from. This meant that the victims and wit-
nesses spoke in one language, 330 which had to be translated to the
language of the interviewer (often officials from countries in which
victims took refuge), then translated again to the language of the testi-
fying expert, and finally translated once more to the languages used at
the Tribunals. 33' Multiple translation greatly increases the possibility
of mistaken interpretation-this in a case where the Prosecution could
not even ascertain (due to supposed translation difficulties) whether
one of its own witnesses had actually seen the defendant at the scene
of criminal activity. 332 Layer upon layer of hearsay evidence obvi-
327. See id.
328. See SCHARF, supra note 24, at 128.
329. See DENITCH, supra note 63, at 28.
330. See id. The majority of "Yugoslavs" speak either "Serbo-Croatian" or "Croato-Serbian,"
whose differences resemble "the differences between British and American versions of the Eng-
lish language." Id. Most Rwandans speak Kinyarwanda. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note
77, at 31.
331. The official languages of the ICTY were English and French. See ICTY Statute, supra
note 139, at Art. 33. At the ICTR, many of the witnesses spoke in Kinyarwanda, which was
translated first into French and then into English. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 31.
When differences arose between the French and English versions of the translated testimony, the
Chamber relied on the French. See id.
332. See supra Part II.C.
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ously compounds the problem. Use of expert testimony of this sort
invites mistakes in oral transmission.
In the Tadic trial, Hanne Sophie Greve testified as an expert.333
She was a member of the Commission of Experts developed to inves-
tigate international human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia. 334
Her investigation focused primarily on the Prijedor region (in which
Tadic had lived) and encompassed information based on interviews
from 400 witnesses. 335 The purpose of Greve's testimony was to es-
tablish the background, nature, and extent of the conflict in Prijedor
through the use of these interviews. 336 The interviews, however, were
conducted by others-lawyers, government officials, and police of-
ficers-"at [Greve's] behest. ' 337 The defense objected to the Prosecu-
tion's calling Greve as an expert witness because, it claimed, she
would merely offer an opinion based on hearsay evidence. 338 The ob-
jection Tadic's attorney, Steven Kay, raised regarding Greve's testi-
mony was a poignant one: "[Greve's testimony] strays beyond the
traditional band of expertise that would be required into an area of
opinion and comment that is seeking to provide conclusions to the
Tribunal based on research otherwise provided to it.''339
Kay's point was clear-expertise is not needed to summarize and
interpret 400 interviews, especially in light of the fact that some of
those witnesses would be testifying themselves. By way of her testi-
mony, Kay argued, Greve would be "usurping the role of [the] Court"
by making her own findings of fact-the Court's duty.340 He stressed
that an expert witness is supposed to "assist the Court in relation to
matters that the Court may not otherwise understand and need gui-
dance upon."'341 The problem with his argument, though, was that no
333. See Testimony of Hanne Sophie Greve at 27 <http://www.un.org/icty/transe1/960520ED.txt>
[hereinafter Greve Testimony 1]. At the time of the Tadic trial, Greve was a judge in the Court




337. Id. at 29. One of the reasons Greve enlisted others to conduct the interviews of the
victims and witnesses was that the Commission of Experts had very little resources. See id. at 42.
In order to interview witnesses, the Commission needed to find survivors of the conflict located
in other countries-Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Malaysia, Germany, and Croatia. See id.
Because the interviewers could not be paid, the Commission relied on the governments of these
various countries to assist in finding people to conduct the interviews. See id.
338. Id. at 31-32.
339. See Greve Testimony I, supra note 333, at 31.
340. See id. at 29.
341. See id. Kay, in asserting this point, was seemingly referring to the common adversarial
tenet that "expert" witnesses may only testify if they provide some "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge" to the court. FED. R. EvID. 702.
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rule governing expert testimony existed in the ICTY Rules of Evi-
dence. Nonetheless, Rule 89(A)'s mandate that "a Chamber may ex-
clude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
need to ensure a fair trial," Kay argued, supported his objection to
Greve's testimony.342
Prosecutor Alan Tieger disputed Kay's arguments stating that
Greve would not testify as to specific instances of conduct but only to
the general conflict in Prijedor.343 Tieger also argued that Greve's tes-
timony would simply be "her conclusions based on the intersection of
all information available," not just a summary of the interviews.344
Tieger insisted that the Chamber could give as much or as little weight
to any witness' testimony as it deemed appropriate; therefore, if
Greve's testimony did turn out to be premised solely on the witness's
interviews, the Chamber could devalue or disregard it.345 This argu-
ment was a good one because Tieger essentially told the Chamber that
it had nothing to lose by listening to Greve's testimony.
The Chamber ruled that Greve's testimony was relevant and proba-
tive and could be offered by the Prosecution under Rule 89.346 The
Chamber explained that its decision did not "in any way bind [it] from
excluding the testimony, should [it] make such a determination after
hearing the testimony and hearing the context in which it is given. '347
The presiding judge, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, explicitly defended
the decision by claiming that as experienced judges, and not lay jurors,
the panel would be able to listen to the proffered testimony and "give
it the appropriate weight. ' 348 The real question that this approach
poses, though, is whether the judges, after listening to endless layers
of hearsay can truly "unring" the bell.349
Greve's testimony should disturb even those with no training re-
garding the laws of evidence. She predicated her opinion almost en-
tirely on witness interviews and newspaper articles. 350 First, under the
guise of "expert," Greve testified repeatedly to what other people said
and the way other people (the victims) felt.351 At the beginning of
342. Greve Testimony 1, supra note 333, at 30.
343. See id. at 33.
344. Id.
345. See id. at 35.
346. See id. at 36.
347. Id.
348. Greve Testimony 1, supra note 333, at 36.
349. See supra note 312.
350. See, e.g., Greve Testimony I, supra note 333.
351. See id. at 45 (testifying that after the takeover of the Prijedor region by the Serbs, non-
Serbs "started to feel that they were being isolated"); id. at 54 (testifying that based
on her "impression" from victim interviews, "people were really surprised" about the
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Greve's testimony, Kay asked the Chamber to require Greve to ex-
plain the basis upon which she would testify-suspecting that her tes-
timony was based solely on witness interviews.35 2 Greve had
previously testified that she had never been to Prijedor, so Kay's ap-
prehension about her testifying as to what happened on specific dates
was more than reasonable.35 3 Tieger agreed that Greve would tell the
Chamber how she came upon her information, but stressed the diffi-
culty she would have in identifying "each and every source which con-
verges on particular pieces of information. '354 Tieger suggested that
there was no possible way for Greve to identify where she got all her
information.
Kay's request that a basis be given was certainly an appropriate one
for a defense attorney to make. Experts usually must have a basis for
their opinions.35 5 In the United States, an expert may predicate his or
her opinion on first-hand knowledge or various other identifiable
sources, even if those sources are not by themselves admissible. 356
Here, as it turned out, Greve's testimony was not, for the most part,
based on either first-hand knowledge or identifiable sources. It is true
that the ICTY does not utilize the Federal Rules of Evidence; how-
ever, it is not acceptable in any forum for a witness to simply summa-
rize what masses of unidentified others have said. This
unquestionably violates a defendant's right to a fair trial by denying
the defense an opportunity to effectively cross-examine.35 7 Greve's
testimony should have been excluded under Rule 89(A) because its
probative value was substantially outweighed by the need to ensure
the defendant's right to a fair trial.358 Greve's inability to reveal the
exact sources upon which she relied made it abundantly clear that she
was simply summarizing the information the victim interviews had
unveiled.
unfolding situation in Prijedor); id. at 58 (testifying that the Muslims in Prijedor were really
"frightened" by the Serb use of propaganda). See Testimony of Greve at 16
<http://www.un.org/icty/transel/960521it.htm> [hereinafter Greve Testimony III (testifying that
"people were confused" about the actions of the political parties within Bosnia-Herzegovina and
"did not really feel that they knew enough about the situation"); id. at 51 (claiming that "people
in Kozarac felt as if they were bombarded from every side at the same time").
352. See Greve Testimony I, supra note 333, at 42. Kay asked that the Chamber be told "how
she is able to tell us what happened in Prijedor" given that she had never been there. Id.
353. See id. at 43-44.
354. Id. at 44.
355. See FED. R. EvID. 703.
356. See id.
357. In the United States, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert can base her opin-
ion on those things "perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing" if it is
information "reasonably relied upon by experts" in that field. Id.
358. See ICTY Rules, supra note 213, at Rule 89(D).
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Other than the witness interviews, Greve relied heavily on newspa-
per articles throughout her testimony.359 This seems particularly dubi-
ous especially given the fact that the press in Bosnia during this time
was not free. It was controlled by Serb forces, who routinely propa-
gandized the circumstances of the conflict. It seems almost laughable
to rely on propaganda, which is distorted and deceptive by defini-
tion, 360 as a means of determining the true nature of the conflict in
Prijedor.
Greve based much of her testimony on the Prijedor newspaper,
Kozarski Viesnik.361 She used the reports in this newspaper in three
ways to prove the nature of the conflict in Prijedor. First, Greve relied
on newspaper reports to fashion her central thesis-that the initial in-
filtration by Serbs into Prijedor determined everything that happened
thereafter.362 To explain the beginning of the Serbian takeover,
Greve's "best source" was an interview given in the newspaper by a
Serbian police officer a full year after the takeover. 363 A number of
serious problems arise when considering this portion of Greve's opin-
ion. As was mentioned above, it is very likely that the newspaper arti-
cle was partially or entirely fabricated, and thus fundamentally
unreliable. Moreover, the person interviewed was a Serb police of-
ficer, likely to have presented a severely skewed version of the partic-
ular facts concerning the Prijedor takeover. The interview occurred a
year after the incident in question, rendering the officer's story espe-
cially susceptible to misrecollection. 364 Finally, when Greve testified
regarding this interview, she did not have the article in front of her.
Therefore, she too, could have incorrectly relayed its contents to the
Chamber. The very premise upon which much of Greve's testimony
rested was infected by layers of untested and potentially unreliable
hearsay.
359. Greve Testimony 1, supra note 333, at 45, 52, 53; Greve Testimony II, supra note 351, at 9,
28, 29, 40, 46, 59, 64, 65, 71.
360. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1078 (3d ed. 1991). "[I]deas, doctrines, or
allegations so spread: now often used disparagingly to connote deception or distortion." Id.
361. See Greve Testimony I, supra note 333, at 45.
362. See id. at 50-54. The "takeover" of Prijedor by Serbian forces occurred on April 30, 1992.
See Tadic Judgment, supra note 160, at 24.
363. Greve Testimony I, supra note 333, at 45.
364. See State v. Saporen, 285 N.W. 898, 900-01 (Minn. 1939) (stating, "[flalse testimony is apt
to harden and become unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion as the witness has opportu-
nity for reconsideration and influence by the suggestion of others, whose interest may be, and
often is, to maintain falsehood rather than truth").
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Greve next utilized newspaper articles to explain the mechanics of
Serbian seizure of Muslim-dominated regions. 365 For example, when
discussing the importance of the "corridor" which linked Serbia
proper to Prijedor and other regions, 366 Greve relied on a speech
printed in the newspaper to characterize the importance of this corri-
dor to "Serbian officials. ' 367 To formulate her opinion, Greve not
only speculated about Serbian officials' views, but did so after these
views were filtered by Kozarski Vjesnik. 368 It seems that it would
have been much simpler just to offer the speech into evidence. Greve
also relied on articles to describe the Serbian ploy of creating illegal
police stations in Prijedor to install Serb forces before the takeover.369
Prosecutor Alan Tieger asked Greve questions and in reply, Greve did
nothing more than read the contents of a newspaper article containing
the answer:
Q: "[L]et me direct your attention first to the first line [of the arti-
cle]. Does the interview with Simo Drijaca indicate who selected
him to set up these illegal police stations?
A: Yes, it is indicated that it was done by the Serb Democratic
Party, the SDS." '370
Finally, Greve used newspaper articles to prove the extinction and
genocide of Muslims and Croats by Serbs in Prijedor.371 For example,
in order to prove when the slaughter of Muslims and Croats began,
Greve read from a translated newspaper article from an unknown
publisher. 372 It is hard to believe that this type of evidence could be
admitted as more probative than prejudicial. Cross-examination of
the declarant was unavailable and the declarant was not even known,
so any attempt to assess his credibility would be absolutely futile.
Similarly, in one of the more egregious examples of inappropriately
365. See id. at 28-29 (reading an article characterizing military commander, Simo Radanovic);
id. at 59 (testifying to what the Chairman of the Serbian Municipal Assembly of Prijedor, Dr.
Milomir Stakic, saw at the concentration camps in Prijedor by summarizing the contents of a
newspaper article); id. at 64-65 (reading an article describing Milomir Stakic's feelings about
reports of killings in Omarska).
366. See id. at 50-54. This "corridor" was a special passageway which enabled Serbs to travel
easily from Serbia proper to areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina without having to use the highways or
railroads. See id.
367. See id. at 53.
368. See id. Greve described the article's report of the officials' characterization of the corri-
dor, "'The word 'corridor' is too weak to describe that bond [between Serbia and Bosnia-Herze-
govina]. The neck is not a corridor between the head and the body; it is all one being, the being
of the Serbian nation."' Id.
369. See Greve Testimony II, supra note 351, at 8-13.
370. Id. at 9.
371. See id. at 40, 65-80.
372. See id. at 40.
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admitted hearsay evidence, Greve read from an interview of Simo
Drlijaca, head of Serb police forces in Prijedor. 373 Greve, under Alan
Tieger's direction, stated that one portion of the interview explained
Serb officials' anger about not being "permitted to impose just punish-
ment on those Muslims and Croats who had been proven to have par-
ticipated in genocide. ' 374 In this instance, both Greve and Tieger
interpreted the out-of-court words of Driljaca and drew conclusions as
to what his words meant-presumably the duty of the Chamber, not
the witness or the Prosecutor.
It is questionable whether Greve's testimony was needed at all. The
Chamber could have skipped the middleman (woman) and gained the
same insight simply by reading the Kozarski Vjesnik and other articles
itself. Why were four days wasted so that Greve could summarize the
interviews of witnesses (many of whom would testify themselves) and
read newspaper articles to the Chamber? It is difficult to determine
how much weight the Trial Chamber gave Greve's testimony. Be-
cause she provided only background information, determining her ef-
fect on Tadic's fate is impossible. The most likely result of Greve's
testimony was to color the general impression the judges came to hold
about the conflict in Prijedor. Whether these general impressions im-
pacted the result in Tadic's trial is debatable, yet the admission of "ex-
pert" opinion similar to Greve's is likely to become more troublesome
in future ICTY or ICTR cases. If the instigators or planners of the
Serbian attack on Prijedor are tried, instead of a man like Tadic (con-
sidered to be low on the totem pole), reliance on hearsay evidence
through an "expert" could produce unjust results. Evidence of this
type supposedly establishes that one group of people (in this case the
Serbs) committed serious crimes against another group (the Muslims
or Croats). By proving that the accused was part of the former group,
then, the Prosecution could use the expert hearsay evidence to convict
him.
The use of expert testimony as a conduit for inadmissible hearsay
evidence did not play as large a role in Akayesu as it did in Tadic.
Alison DesForges testified as an expert witness in the Akayesu trial.375
She is an American human rights activist who had studied Rwanda for
over thirty years while working for Human Rights Watch/Africa.376
373. See id. at 70-71.
374. Id. at 71. Greve explained indications in the interview that during the "informative
talks" (or interviews) with Muslims and Croats, the Serbs "extracted" from them confessions to
their participation in genocide. Id.
375. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 20.
376. See Stephen Buckley, Rwandan Suspects Face Trial and Error, WASH. POST FoR. SFRV.,
Jan. 29, 1997, at A15.
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Her credentials-those of a bonafide expert-are starkly different
from those of Hanne Sophie Greve. Greve, a Norwegian judge, was
specially appointed to study the atrocities in Prijedor. DesForges, on
the other hand, had studied Rwanda as a human rights activist. Ab-
stractly, it could be argued that Greve would make a better impartial
expert because of her juridical background and experience. In fact,
though, DesForges provided the Tribunal with much more assistance
than did Greve because of her extensive knowledge of Rwanda.
Greve studied Prijedor for only a few months, contrasted to
DesForges' thirty years. Also, DesForges knew the tenor of Rwanda
even before the conflict at issue in the ICTR had developed, while
Greve studied Prijedor only after the conflict there had fully erupted.
The most substantial difference between the testimony of Hanne
Sophie Greve and Alison DesForges, however, was the type of infor-
mation upon which each based her respective opinion. As discussed
above, Greve's opinion was largely based on dubious and legally unre-
liable sources, such as second-hand witness interviews and newspaper
articles. DesForges, by contrast, was not a member of the Commis-
sion of Experts created to investigate the crimes in Rwanda, so her
opinion was based primarily on her own independent research. 377 She
was called as an expert regarding the history of and conflict in
Rwanda. 378 She was not asked to speculate, as was Greve, about the
feelings and impressions of victims and witnesses, but rather to ex-
plain the impetus and results of the conflict. 379 The Prosecution in
Akayesu used DesForges in a much more limited and appropriate
manner. Instead of permitting an "expert" to summarize the way wit-
nesses felt, the Prosecutor at the ICTR allowed the victims to tell their
own stories. In this way, the ICTR Chamber could assess both
DesForges' credibility as an expert and each victim's veracity as a wit-
ness. This is a much better approach than requiring the Chamber to
sift through layers of hearsay evidence to winnow the credible from
the incredible. Also, the ICTR's approach was fairer because it al-
lowed the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against him.
377. The Commission of Experts for Rwanda was made up of three men who spent only a
week in Rwanda, conducting no investigations. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra
note 128, at 46.





Aside from the hearsay problems associated with expert testimony,
lay testimony presented hearsay questions of its own during both the
Tadic and Akayesu trials. In Tadic's trial, a great deal of hearsay evi-
dence was admitted through the testimony of lay witnesses. It is likely
that most of the hearsay evidence was innocuous; however, some ob-
jectionable hearsay was admitted that explicitly placed the defendant
at the scene of criminal activity. For example, Azra Blazevic, a vet-
erinarian from Kozarac, told of her experiences during the Serb take-
over of that town.380 Blazevic operated an animal hospital there, but
when the Serbs attacked, she was taken, along with many other civil-
ians, to the Trnopolje concentration camp.381 While Serbs escorted
her and others to the buses which would travel to Trnopolje, Blazevic
testified that she heard Tadic call out the name of a man, Nihad
Bahonijic, a Muslim ambulance driver. 382  Blazevic testified that
Bahonijic was left in Kozarac with Tadic and never seen again, imply-
ing that Tadic had killed him.383
The problem with Blazevic's testimony was her identification of
Tadic during this incident. She claimed that while she was standing on
the side of a road surrounded by a group of soldiers, somebody whis-
pered, "'There is Dule. ' ' 38 4 It was not until this was said that
Blazevic looked up and saw a man crossing the street carrying a
weapon. 385 She saw his face for only a few seconds, she admitted, yet
seemed positive that it was Tadic.386 This type of testimony is suspi-
cious because the witness did not recognize the defendant until the
out-of-court declarant pointed him out. Because Tadic was some dis-
tance away, a question arises as to whether the original declarant actu-
ally knew this to be Tadic, or if the man crossing the street only looked
like him. Unfortunately for the defense, the declarant was not present
at the trial to be cross-examined as to his identification. It is conceiva-
ble that the man crossing the street looked very similar to Tadic and
when the declarant identified him, Blazevic accepted the remark. Of
course, it very well might have been the defendant, yet this type of
380. See Azra Blazevic Testimony, Tadic Case IT-94-1-T-13 June 1996
<http://www.un.org/icty/transe1/9606]3it.htm> [hereinafter Blazevic Testimony].
381. See id. at 12-13.
382. See id. at 6.
383. See id. at 11.
384. Id. at 7. "Dule" is a nickname for "Dusko." Tadic is often referred to as Dule through-
out witness testimony.
385. See id.
386. See Blazevic Testimony, supra note 380, at 7.
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evidence should not be admitted because Tadic was not given the op-
portunity to test the veracity of the identification.
On cross-examination, Tadic's attorney, Michail Wladimiroff, ques-
tioned the accuracy of Blazevic's recollection of Tadic crossing the
street. 387 Blazevic admitted she could not describe Tadic's face at the
time he was purportedly crossing the street, and in fact, was no longer
sure that Tadic had been in Kozarac just before the attack as she
claimed on direct examination. 388 Had Blazevic's testimony been lim-
ited so as to eliminate the hearsay statement, Wladimiroff's cross-ex-
amination would have been entirely effective in discrediting Blazevic's
identification of Tadic. However, as things stood, the hearsay identifi-
cation was still before the court as evidence of Tadic's presence and
this identification would not be confronted and discredited. The ad-
mission of hearsay evidence, here, raised serious questions regarding
Tadic's ability to confront his accusers. 38 9 Without the declarant pres-
ent, there was no way the defense could inquire about who the declar-
ant referred to when he said, "There is Dule"-a serious matter
because "Dule" is a very common diminutive in the region.
Another example of the admission of damaging hearsay evidence
occurred in the testimony of Hussein Hodzic, a former mining techni-
cian in Kozarac who was forced into the Omarska concentration
camp. 390 Hodzic, along with many others, shared a room with Emir
Karabasic, the man killed in the castration incident.391 Hodzic testi-
fied that Karabasic was frequently called out of the room only to re-
turn with "very marked signs of beatings. ' 392 Hodzic explained how
Karabasic felt about Tadic-"he was very frightened" and "full of
fear. ' 393 Hodzic continued by telling the Chamber that on several oc-
casions, Karabasic said, "If Dule comes, then I am gone, I am fin-
ished. ' 394 Defense attorney Wladimiroff did not take issue with
Hodzic's speculation about how Karabasic felt, but quickly objected
387. See id. at 63-66.
388. See id. at 64.
389. On cross-examination, Wladimiroff also presented the possibility that when the declarant
said, "There is Dule," he was referring to another Dule, not Tadic. Id. at 63. He pointed out that
Blazevic herself knew "[a] few" people with this name, leaving open the chance that the "Dule"
referred to was someone with the same name, but not Tadic. Id.
390. See Testimony of Husein Hodzic at 13-15 <http://www.un.orglicty/transe1/960725ED.txt>
[hereinafter Hodzic Testimony].
391. See id. at 22.
392. Id. Hodzic explained, "You could clearly see the marks from the chain which were on his
chest, from some iron bars, because there was a straight line. About 90 percent of his body was
black .... Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 24.
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to Hodzic's retelling of Karabasic's statements about Tadic. 395
Wladimiroff argued that Hodzic's testimony involved prejudicial hear-
say evidence which would prevent the defendant from receiving a fair
trial (the test under Rule 89(C)).396 In response, Prosecutor Tieger
argued that even under adversarial hearsay rules Hodzic's testimony
as to what Karabasic said would fall under the "state of mind
exception. '397
This argument may have been effective in the United States where
hearsay evidence offered to prove the state of mind of the declarant
has been admitted.398 One court held out-of-court declarations admis-
sible if the statement tended "to prove the declarant's intention at the
time it was made," was stated "under circumstances which naturally
give verity to the utterance," and was "relevant to an issue in the
case. '399 Tieger could have attempted to fit Hodzic's testimony into
the test outlined above, yet there are serious questions about whether
"[a] declaration as to what one person intended to do" can "safely be
accepted as evidence of what another probably did. '400 Thus, it would
have been understandable to admit Karabasic's statements to show
what he intended to do. However, to admit evidence regarding
Karabasic's state of mind to prove what Tadic did is inappropriate.
Tieger proffered Karabasic's statements as evidence that he was
scared of Tadic; however, what these statements actually showed, was
Tadic's probable involvement in the castration of Karabasic-an un-
tenable use of hearsay evidence. The admission of this hearsay evi-
dence also refuted the testimony of witness "H" that Tadic was not
involved in the castration incident, seemingly giving preference to
hearsay evidence over "H"'s eyewitness testimony. 401 In response to
Wladimiroff's objections, the presiding judge, McDonald, again de-
fended the Chamber's ability to subsequently exclude Karabasic's
statements if it found them to be more prejudicial than probative.40 2
Because of the almost inconceivable nature of the crime at issue, the
395. See id. at 22.
396. See Hodzic Testimony, supra note 390, at 22-23.
397. Id. at 23.
398. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892) (holding that "[t]he exist-
ence of a particular intention in a certain person at a certain time being a material fact to be
proved, evidence that he expressed that intention at that time is as direct evidence of the fact, as
his own testimony that he then had that intention would be").
399. People v. Alcalde, 148 P.2d 627, 632 (1944).
400. Id. at 633 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
401. See supra Part II.C (analyzing "H"'s testimony).
402. See Hodzic Testimony, supra note 390, at 23.
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castration of Karabasic, the Chamber's disregard of Karabasic's state-
ments seems unlikely.40 3
A great deal of witness testimony in Tadic contained hearsay evi-
dence similar to that described above and placed Tadic at the scene of
criminal activity.40 4 Throughout the trial, the Chamber claimed to be
able to disregard any unreliable testimony if it chose to do so. The
implications of the admission of this hearsay evidence, here, are not
provable, yet there is some literature which suggests judges are not
able to disregard potentially unreliable evidence as readily as they
claim.4 05 Therefore, it is possible that the admission of hearsay evi-
dence was more prejudicial to the accused's right to a fair trial than it
was probative.
Hearsay evidence admitted through lay testimony presented special
problems in Akayesu's trial. This was because of the difficulty of
translating the Rwandan language, Kinyarwanda, to French or Eng-
lish. The problem was so serious that the Prosecution called a linguis-
tics expert, Dr. Mathias Ruzindana, to explain the problematic
translation of Kinyarwanda. 40 6 Dr. Ruzindana warned the Chamber
that "while a word for seeing and hearing was, like in other languages,
not the same, Rwandans tended to describe events without distin-
guishing between the two. ' 40 7 Hence, this makes the law's concerns
with hearsay identification exceedingly difficult to operationalize.
Similarly, in Kinyarwanda, one word can have different meanings de-
pending on the time and context of its use. 408 For example, the word
"Inyenzi" means "cockroach" in everyday use, yet during the
Rwandan conflict, this word was used to describe the Tutsi and Hutu
refugees who participated in the clandestine incursions into
Rwanda.40 9 When a witness said the word "Inyenzi," therefore, the
translator and the Chamber had to be fully aware of its connotation
when used. This problem is enhanced when a witness testifies to a
statement made by an out-of-court delcarant because the possibility
for misinterpretation increases.
403. See generally Landsman & Rakos, Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors, supra note
312.
404. See Testimony of "Q" at 9 <http://www.un.org/icty/transe1/960611RD.txt>; Testimony
of Sead Halvadzic at 15 <http://www.un.org/icty/transel/960716ED.txt>; Testimony of
Nasima Klipic <http://www.un.orglicty/transel/9606141T.txt>; Testimony of Kasim Mesic
<http:/www.un.orglictyltransel/96071T.txt>; Blazevic Testimony, supra note 380; Testimony of
"R," supra note 268.
405. See supra note 312.
406. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 31.
407. Muna et al., supra note 300, at 1480.
408. See Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 31.
409. See id. at 32.
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Another problem is that many different Kinyarwanda words trans-
late into a single word in French or English.410 For example, the
words "gusambanya, kurungora, kuryamana, and gufata ku ngufu"
were all translated to mean "rape" in English and French.41' In Kiny-
arwanda, however, each word means something slightly different. 412
"Gusambanya" actually means "to bring (a person) to commit adul-
tery or fornication," whereas "kurungora" means "to have sexual in-
tercourse with a woman. '413 Similarly, "kuryamana" means "to share
a bed or to have sexual intercourse," while "gufata ku ngufu" means
"to take (anything) by force" and "to rape. ' 414 Ignorance of these
slight distinctions could result in a mistaken rape conviction. Again,
hearsay evidence compounds this already complicated linguistic issue.
Because many of the witnesses in Akayesu's trial were native
Rwandans, it was critical that the Chamber understand this distinction
between languages. However, even with Dr. Ruzindana's caveat, the
Chamber had to confront several problems to assess the credibility of
each witness's testimony. It had to first decide whether the witness
had actually seen the incident he testified to, or whether he had only
heard about it. If the witness had only heard about the incident and
was reporting an out-of-court statement, the Chamber had to some-
how determine whether the original delcarant's words were accurately
interpreted by the witness and whether that interpretation was trans-
lated correctly. This duty was made extraordinarily difficult by the
distinctions Dr. Ruzindana outlined. Translation problems under-
scored the likelihood of mistaken oral transmission and thus unrelia-
ble testimony.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Various attempts have been made since 1946 to establish a perma-
nent forum in which international criminals can be tried,415 but it was
not until 1996 that a draft statute for the ICC was accepted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations. 416 The final Statute for the
410, See id. at 31.
411. Id. at 32.
412. See id.
413. Id.
414. Akayesu Judgement, supra note 77, at 32.
415. See generally Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 128 (discussing the legal
and political struggles since the 1919 Treaty of Versailles to the ICTR within the context of a
trend toward creating an international criminal court); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical Survey:
1919-1998, in STATUTE OF r[E ICC, supra note 142, at 1 [hereinafter Bassiouni, Historical Sur-
vey] (presenting an historical overview of international law since 1919 in the context of creating
an international criminal court).
416. See Bassiouni, Historical Survey, supra note 415, at 18.
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ICC was adopted on July 17, 1998 at the Rome Diplomatic Confer-
ence after six sessions of debate and discussion of the Preparatory
Committee.417 The Statute will be open for signature until December
31, 2000.418 At the time this Comment was written, there had been
ninety-four signatories and seven ratifications.419 It is unlikely that
the ICC will begin operation for at least a few years. This is because it
does not, according to its own terms, enter into force until "the first
day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit
of the 60th instrument of ratification.., with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations. '420 This means before the ICC will become effec-
tive, fifty-three more ratifications are necessary.
In drafting the Statute, the drafting committee and the Rapporteur
of the International Law Commission drew on the experiences of the
ICTY and ICTR, as is clear by the similarity of crimes covered and
language used.421 The ICC Statute is similar to the Tribunals' statutes
in the crimes it governs and the culpability it requires. 422 The ICC,
like the ICTY and ICTR, has the power to bring persons to justice for
"the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as
a whole; ' 423 however, the ICC provides a permanent forum for the
prosecution of such crimes. With the establishment of the ICC, there
need not be ad hoc tribunals created to cover tragic events like those
that have occurred in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. One sub-
stantial difference, though, between the ICC's jurisdiction and that of
the ICTY and ICTR, is that the ICC's jurisdiction will be complemen-
417. See id. at 20. The Preparatory Committee was set up by the General Assembly in 1996 to
debate and discuss the draft statute presented by the International Law Commission and create
a draft of its own. See id. The sessions of the Preparatory Committee met on March 25th
through April 12th 1996, August 12th through August 30th 1996, February l1th through 21st
1997, August 4th through 15th 1997, December 1st through t2th 1997, and March 16th through
April 3rd 1998. See id.
418. See id. at 33. The Statute, like any other treaty, is first signed by governments, but does
not become law until after the treaty has been ratified under domestic law. For a discussion on
the operation of treaties, see STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 133, at 30-40.
419. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Courts: Ratification Status
<www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm> (on file with author). The States that have ratified the
Statute include Senegal, Trinidad and Tobago, San Marino, Italy, Fiji, Norway, and Ghana. See
id. The United States has not yet signed the ICC Statute and there is much debate as to whether
it should at all. See Cara Levy Rodriguez, Comment, Slaying the Monster: Why the United States
Should Not Support the Rome Treaty, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 805 (1999) (discussing the United
States' positions on the ICC Statute and recommending that it not be adopted).
420. STATUTE OF THE ICC, supra note 142, at art. 126.
421. For example, compare arts. 5, 6, 7 of the ICC Statute, with arts. 2, 3, 4, 5 of the ICTY
Statute, supra note 139.
422. The ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, aggression, war crimes, and crimes against hu-
manity. See STATUTE OF THE ICC, supra note 142, at 40-44 (arts. 5-8).
423. Id. at 40 (art. 5).
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tary to national criminal courts.42 4 Therefore, unlike the ICTY and
ICTR, the ICC will not be able to require that certain war criminals
be tried before it. Rather, it will have to follow the very particular
procedures laid out in Article 13 of the Statute to garner jurisdiction
from domestic courts.425
The ICC's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, at the time of this
Comment, have been and are currently being promulgated by a Pre-
paratory Commission established by the General Assembly. The rules
are yet to be adopted, but are largely modeled after the Rules utilized
by the ICTY and ICTR.426 This makes perfect sense because the Tri-
bunal rules have been applied to cases similar to the ones that are
expected to be tried at the ICC. In creating the rules for the ICC, it
was critical for the drafters to consider the evidentiary problems that
arose in the Tadic and Akayesu trials in order to avoid repeating
them.427 Though there are thousands of potential defendants waiting
to be tried in both the ICTY and ICTR, "the Security Council's ability
to keep these ad hoc tribunals in operation may prove difficult" be-
cause they could, in theory, continue forever. 428 It is likely, then, that
the remaining tribunal cases could be taken over by the ICC after it
has been fully activated.42 9 A question arises about how to accom-
plish the goal of preventing evidentiary problems discussed above
from recurring-should the Tribunals' Rules be changed or should
they simply be applied more carefully?
A. Anonymous Testimony
Because the Tribunals' Rules do not explicitly allow for the testi-
mony of anonymous witnesses, it seems clear that the ICTY's error in
allowing such testimony (if it is to be considered an error) can be rem-
edied through more cautious application of the rules. It is conceiva-
ble, however, that the ICC could accept the testimony of anonymous
witnesses if the reasoning of the Tadic trial is followed because the
424. See id. at 46 (art. 13).
425. See id.
426. See Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator, Preparatory Commission for the In-
ternational Criminal Court, Working Group on Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/RT.5 (July 1, 1999).
427. At the Intersessional Meeting held in Siracusa, Sicily in June-July of 1999, attended by
the author, Michael Keegan, a deputy prosecutor at the ICTY, played a major role in drafting
what has become the eventual rules of evidence of procedure. He shared with the other diplo-
mats and drafters at the conference the problems and successes of the rules of evidence and
procedure in place at the ICTY. Without his contributions, the rules would not have looked the
way they do.
428. Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 128, at 57.
429. See id.
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ICC Statute contains the same language that was relied upon by the
Trial Chamber in Tadic. The Statute, in Article 67, paragraph 1, sec-
tion (e) provides that the defendant is entitled "[t]o examine, or have
examined, the witnesses against him or her .. ."-43o If this section of
Article 67 is read in conjunction with paragraph 5 of Article 68, enti-
tled "Protection of the victims and witnesses and their participation in
the proceedings," it seems that anonymous testimony may be admit-
ted. Paragraph 5 of Article 68 states:
Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this
Statute may lead to the grave endangerment of the security of a
witness or his or her family, the Prosecutor may, for the purposes of
any proceedings conducted prior to the commencement of the trial,
withhold such evidence or information and instead submit a sum-
mary thereof.431
This Article leaves open the possibility that the testimony of a victim
or witness may be presented in summary form by the Prosecutor, and
thus not subject to cross-examination by the defense. The tension be-
tween the protection of victims and witnesses and the defendant's
right to a fair trial again arises seemingly without an acceptable solu-
tion. Articles 67 and 68 seem to be in direct conflict with each other-
one protecting the defendant's right to confront, the other one al-
lowing for no cross-examination. Though the Statute can no longer be
changed, except through amendment, 432 the Rules of Evidence and
Procedure could provide specific protection against anonymous wit-
ness testimony. Perhaps the ICC's rules should include a provision
which explicitly confronts the issues the ICTY grappled with in
Tadic-'"to ensure a fair trial, no witness' identity shall remain anony-
mous to the defendant or his counsel," for example. 43
3
In order to alleviate the need for anonymous witnesses, the ICC
should provide adequate protective measures to witnesses and victims
so that they feel secure testifying. These measures should include
physical safety while at the ICC, psychological assistance to cope with
the trauma of testifying, and the ability to have family members pres-
ent during difficult testimony. Also, protection should be made avail-
able after the witness has testified to prevent possible retribution
against the witness or her family. There are significant protections for
430. STATUTE OF THE ICC, supra note 142, at 73 (art. 67). Compare this Article with Article
21 of the ICTY Statute. See ICTY Statute, supra note 139, at Art. 21.
431. STATUTE OF THE ICC, supra note 142, at 74.
432. Amendment procedures appear in articles 121 and 122. See id. at 97-98.




victims and witnesses laid out in Article 68 of the Statute, but whether
these safeguards will work can only be anticipated. 434
B. Hearsay Evidence
To solve the hearsay problems discussed above, the drafters will
have to think more seriously about a manageable compromise be-
tween the adversarial and inquisitorial approaches. With no hearsay
rule at all, as was demonstrated in Tadic, a great deal of potentially
unreliable and incriminating evidence gains admission. 435 Though the
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not include a hearsay rule,
the closest they come to protecting against the potential hearsay
problems is to allow the "Chamber of the Court to determine [the]
relevance and admissibility" of the evidence presented. 436 Of course,
this same protection was available, really to no avail, in the Tadic
trial.437 Therefore, it will be necessary for the ICC's future Chambers
to be more careful and scrutinizing in their application of this rule in
order to prevent the admission of layered hearsay evidence.
Surely, expert testimony should be reigned in to avoid the admis-
sion of massive amounts of unreliable and untested hearsay evidence.
If all the witnesses and victims in a particular case cannot be called to
testify because there are too many or can no longer be located, the
investigator who actually conducted the interviews should testify.
This, at least, eliminates one layer of hearsay evidence. Also, because
of potential translation problems, the judiciary should be warned, as it
was in Akayesu, about possible errors and should require the transla-
tors to take an oath or affirmation to accurately translate.438
Finally, some variant on the hearsay rules in the Federal Rules of
Evidence should be employed by the judges to at least limit the situa-
tions in which hearsay is admitted. For example, hearsay evidence
could be admissible where a Commission of Experts has been ap-
pointed to conduct interviews of victims and witnesses. 439 The rule
would allow a qualified expert who had actually conducted interviews
434. See STATUTE OF THE ICC, supra note 142, at art. 68.
435. As of the writing of this Comment, there was no hearsay rule in the ICC's Rules. It is
very unlikely, if not impossible, that a hearsay rule will be included in the Rules, primarily be-
cause most of the States debating on this topic believe that the experienced judges who will
govern the trials at the ICC will be able to decipher between reliable and unreliable testimony.
436. Discussion Paper Prepared by the Coordinator, supra note 426, at Rule 6.1(a).
437. See supra Part lI.D.
438. This is required under the Federal Rule of Evidence 604, which states: "An interpreter is
subject to the provisions of these rules relating to qualification as an expert and the administra-
tion of an oath or affirmation to make a true translation." FED. R. EvID. 604.
439. This type of limitation on the admittance of hearsay is similar to the exceptions allowed
for in Federal Rule of Evidence 802 which reads: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided
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to testify about the general feelings of the victims and witnesses, but
not about specific criminal acts of the accused. The changes suggested
are not significant ones, yet are nonetheless critical to avoid serious
evidentiary problems and ensure the effectiveness of the ICC.
IV. CONCLUSION
Protecting victims and witnesses and preventing unreliable evidence
from prejudicing a defendant are not new ideas and are not limited to
the international arena. Rather, these evidentiary problems arise in
domestic trials as well. The difficulty in international criminal trials,
though, has been exacerbated by the inability to adequately marry two
legal systems-the adversarial and inquisitorial. With the establish-
ment of the ICC, we must hope that the Rules of Evidence operating
at the ICTY and ICTR can be refined so as to avoid many of the
problems that arose in the Tadic and Akayesu trials.
Kellye L. Fabian
by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority
or by Act of Congress." FED. R. EvID. 802.
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